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AN ORIGINALIST THEORY OF PRECEDENT:
ORIGINALISM, NONORIGINALIST PRECEDENT, AND
THE COMMON GOOD
LEE J. STRANG*
I. INTRODUCTION
There is substantial scholarly disagreement on whether and in what manner prior
decisions of a court-especially the U.S. Supreme Court-interpreting the
Constitution bind the same court' later in time.2 This is despite the consensus of
American legal practice that prior constitutional decisions do bind later courts.' At
the heart of the debate surrounding precedent is the tension between our written
Constitution, which is the supreme law of the land,4 and the role of the unelected
Supreme Court in exercising constitutional judicial review.'

* Assistant Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law. I would like to thank my loving wife Elizabeth
for her sacrifice to allow me to write this Article. Many thanks to Bryce Poole for his excellent research assistance
on this Article. I would also like to thank the participants at the Thomistic Understandingof Natural Law as the
Foundation of Positive Law conference at Ptzminy P6ter Catholic University, Faculty of Law and Political
Sciences, in Budapest, Hungary (organized by Thomas International), and Howard Bromberg, Bruce Frohnen,
Kevin Lee, Ed Lyons, and Steve Safranek.
1. Prior case law of the same court is known as horizontal precedent, which is the focus of this Article.
This Article discusses only tangentially the effect of cases down the hierarchy of courts, which is called vertical
precedent. For a thorough discussion of vertical precedent, see Evan H. Caminker, Why Must InferiorCourts Obey
SuperiorCourts?, 46 STAN. L REV. 817 (1994).
2. Compare,e.g., Gary Lawson, The ConstitutionalCaseAgainst Precedent,17 HARV. J.L. &PUB. POL'Y
23, 24 (1994) ("[Tlhe practice of following precedent is not merely nonobligatory or a bad idea; it is affirmatively
inconsistent with the federal Constitution."), and Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute:
May CongressRemove the PrecedentialEffect ofRoe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1570-82 (2000) ("Without
exaggeration, nothing in the text, history, or structure of the Constitution... supports the proposition that the
judiciary possesses an exclusive constitutional power.. .to prescribe a doctrine of stare decisis."), with Richard H.
Fallon, Stare Decisis and the Constitution:An Essay on ConstitutionalMethodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570,579
(2001) ("[F]amiliar sources can be adduced to suggest that 'the judicial Power' was understood historically to
include a power to create precedents of some degree of binding force."), and Polly J. Price, Precedentand Judicial
PowerAfter the Founding, 42 B.C. L. REV. 81, 81 (2000) ("[Jludicial power [inArticle m] includes a doctrine of
precedent."). See also Thomas Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the
RehnquistCourt, 52 VAND. L REv. 647,683-84 (1999) (concluding that the Founders' understanding ofprecedent
"seems comparable to the modem notion that only an egregious error justifies abandoning precedent," but also
concluding that this understanding of precedent is inapplicable to constitutional adjudication); Norman R.
Williams, The Failingsof Originalism:The FederalCourts and the Power of Precedent,37 U.C. DAVIS L.REV.
761, 803 (2004) (arguing that there is insufficient evidence to arrive at a determinate conclusion regarding "the
Framers' views of the role of precedent in judicial decision making").
3. See, e.g., United States v. IBM Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996) (stating that the Supreme Court will
overrule constitutional precedent based on a "special justification"); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 854 (1992) ("[A] different necessity would make itself felt if a prior judicial ruling should come to be
seen so clearly as error that its enforcement was for that very reason doomed."); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,
827 (1991) ("[W]hen governing [constitutional] decisions are unworkable or are badly reasoned, 'this Court has
never felt constrained to follow precedent."'); Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) (stating that the
Supreme Court will overrule constitutional precedent based on a "special justification"); Burnet v. Coronado Oil
& Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("But in cases involving the Federal
Constitution, where correction through legislative action is practically impossible, this court has often overruled
its earlier decisions.").
2.
4. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
5. As Keith Whittington has noted, "Postulating an interpretative method that could overcome the
countermajoritarian difficulty [has] become the chief task of constitutional theory." KErrH E. WHITTINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 20 (1999)
[hereinafter WHITTINGTON,CoNsTTrUTIONAL INTERPRETATION].
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Further, the existence of numerous and important nonoriginalist precedents is
used by critics of originalism as an argument against originalism. 6 Professor
Michael Gerhardt has argued along these lines: "[F]aithful adherents to original
understanding face an inescapable dilemma. They either can strive to overrule the
better part of constitutional doctrine and thereby thrust the world of constitutional
law into turmoil, or they must abandon original understanding in numerous
substantive areas in order to stabilize constitutional law."7
In this Article, I will offer a theory of constitutional precedent within an
originalist framework. I will argue that a limited respect is due some nonoriginalist
constitutional precedent because of the larger societal and constitutional goal of
effectively pursuing the common good.8
In Part I, I will describe the problem that precedent has posed for scholars and
courts in the area of constitutional adjudication. First, I will explain what I mean by
a theory of precedent. Second, I will briefly discuss the debate over the proper
interpretative methodology of the Constitution. Third, I will show how, for any
plausible theory of constitutional interpretation, there will be precedents that, under
the methodology, are mistakes. Lastly, I will review attempts by originalist scholars
to elucidate a theory of precedent in constitutional adjudication.
In Part I, I will lay out my theory of originalist precedent. First, I will describe
the originalist interpretative methodology I am assuming for purposes of this
Article. Central to that methodology is the concept of the common good. Next, I
will argue that courts should overrule nonoriginalist constitutional precedent except
when overruling the precedent would gravely9 harm society's pursuit of the
common good. I will first show that originalism grounded in the concept of the
common good should and can accommodate a doctrine of precedent, unlike other
forms of originalism, because it is based on the concept of the common good. I will
then establish that the original meaning of "judicial Power" in Article Il included
significant respect for precedent. Thereafter, I will enumerate the criteria judges
should employ when determining when to overrule nonoriginalist precedent. Then
I will apply my originalist theory of precedent to the two modem constitutional law
cases against which interpretative methodologies are-either explicitly or implicitly
-judged: Brown and Roe.' 0

6. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 3 (2001) ("As I argue at length,

the originalist model departs radically from actual Supreme Court practice. As originalists themselves acknowledge,
doctrines that are of central importance in contemporary constitutional law could not be justified on originalist
grounds."); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and ConstitutionalAdjudication, 88 COLUM. L REV. 723, 739

(1988) (arguing that originalism fails to adequately describe our constitutional practice and hence its proponents
"cannot reasonably argue that these [nonoriginalist] transformative changes should now be judicially overthrown").
7.

Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedentin ConstitutionalDecisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO.

WASH. L. REv. 68, 133-34 (1991) (footnote omitted).
8. This Article leaves many issues unaddressed. I have not addressed the role of originalist precedent in
constitutional adjudication. Nor have I addressed the role of stare decisis in state court adjudication of federal
constitutional issues. Lastly, I have not delved deeply into the standard--"gravely harm the common good"-judges
should use when determining whether to overrule nonoriginalist precedent.

9. My thought and research on this issue thus far has led me to tentatively use "gravely," although further
thought and research may persuade me that another modifier, or no modifier, is appropriate. I believe that "gravely"
is appropriate because, as I will explain below, nonoriginalist precedent by itself harms the common good. Thus,

courts should avoid only those overrulings of nonoriginalist precedent that would gravely harm the common good.
10. See FALLON, supra note 6, at 56 (noting that Brown and Roe are the "prism through which
contemporary debates about constitutional theory are often refracted").
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Originalism requires judges to adhere to the meaning of the text of the
Constitution as it was understood when ratified. In constitutional adjudication,
therefore, judges may only apply the positive law of the Constitution and may not,
generally,1' directly apply natural law norms. By contrast, when determining
whether to overrule or limit nonoriginalist precedent, judges will be relatively
unconstrained and will have to make their determinations by looking to what the
common good of society requires. As a result, I conclude by briefly discussing a
theory of judicial virtue to account for how judges should exercise this discretion.
II. THE PROBLEM OF PRECEDENT IN CONSTITUTIONAL
ADJUDICATION
A. What Is a Theory of Precedent?
The practice of following precedent is pervasive in our society, and not only in
the legal realm. 2 To take just one example: those of us who are parents recognize
that the mere fact that we decided an issue in one manner for one child will give rise
to our other children asserting that they should be treated likewise in future similar
situations. 3
In the legal realm, American lawyers have, from our first law class, been
inculcated in the common law method, a central aspect of which is the role of
precedent or stare decisis.' 4 Even as our legal system has become dominated by
statutory and administrative law, the common law case method and precedent
remain the central focus of our legal practice."5
A theory of precedent, as I will use the phrase, is a descriptive analysis of the role
prior cases play in the decision-making processes of later courts and a normative
argument for what that role, if any, should be.' 6 A precedent is a case decided at
Time 1 that is meaningfully analogous to a case that arises at Time 2. A precedent
is "binding" if, at Time 2, a later court,' 7 even though it disagrees with the
conclusion(s) reached in the earlier case at Time 1, is obliged to follow, distinguish,
or give reasons for overruling the previous case. As Frederick Schauer has argued,
"Only if a rule makes relevant the result of a previous decision regardless of a
11. Randy Barnett has argued that the Ninth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities clauses require
judges to protect individual liberty and, in doing so, may draw upon unenumerated rights. RANDY E. BARNETT,
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF IBERTY 53-68 (2004). For an originalist critique of
Barnett's book, see Steven G. Calabresi, The OriginalistandNormative CaseAgainst JudicialActivism: A Reply
to ProfessorRandy Barnett, 103 MICH. L REV. 1081 (2005).
12. Frederick Schauer, Precedent,39 STAN. L. REv. 571, 572 (1987).
13. See id. at 572, 577 (discussing examples of the role precedent plays in parenthood).
14. See Larry Alexander, Constrainedby Precedent,63 S.CAL. L REv. 1, 3 (1989) (discussing the role of
precedent and the common law in American legal education and American law). Stare decisis is from the Latin
phrase, "stare decisis et non quieta movere," meaning, "to stand by things decided, and not to disturb settled
doctrine of precedent, under which it is necessary for a court to follow
points." Stare decisis is defined as "[t]he
earlier judicial decisions when the same points arise again in litigation." BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1443 (8th ed.
2004).
15. See ANTONIN ScALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3-14 (1997)
(explaining the influence of the case method on American lawyers even in an era of statutory law).
16. For an early discussion of precedent, see Schauer, supra note 12, at 572.
17. For purposes of this Article, I am concerned only with precedents in the same court, and specifically,
with Supreme Court constitutional precedent.
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decisionmaker's current belief about the correctness of that decision do we have the
kind of argument from precedent routinely made in law and elsewhere."' 8 Or as
Justice Scalia has more aphoristically stated, "The whole function of the doctrine
[of stare decisis] is to make us say that what is false under proper analysis must
nonetheless be held to be true, all in the interest of stability."' 9
A later court is "bound" in an important sense by what our legal practice labels
precedent when the result of a prior case, and not the reasoning supporting the
result-whether good or bad-is relevant to the later court2z By contrast, if a later
court looks to the reasoning of an earlier case, is persuaded by that reasoning, and
follows it in the case at hand, it is not following the earlier case because of its status
as precedent. 2 1 In other words, it is the status of the earlier case as earlier-notas
well reasoned-that makes it precedential2 2
The most prominent example of the role precedent has played in American
constitutional adjudication is found in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,23 where the Supreme Court declined to overrule Roe v.
Wade24 largely on the basis of stare decisis. In the 1973 decision of Roe, the Court
held that a woman has a constitutional right to abortion. 25 After Presidents Ronald
Reagan and George H.W. Bush appointed five (six if you count former Chief
Justice Rehnquist) of the nine Supreme Court Justices, and after subsequent Court
decisions limited and undermined Roe,z 6 many expected that the Supreme Court in
Casey would overrule Roe.27
The crucial plurality in Casey of three Justices-O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter, all Republican appointees-admitted to "reservations... in reaffirming
the.. .holding of Roe" but relied on "the force of stare decisis" to affirm Roe.28 The
plurality concluded that the Rule of Law 29 values advanced by stare decisis, and the
Court's own legitimacy, were best served by reaffirming Roe. 30 Thus, despite
admitted reservations about whether Roe correctly interpreted the Constitution, the
Casey plurality decision followed Roe's result.

18. Schauer, supra note 12, at 576; see also Monaghan, supra note 6, at 755 ("In some sense, the second
court must feel bound by the precedent.").
19. SCALIA, supra note 15, at 139.
20. Schauer, supra note 12, at 576.
21. Id.
22. Id. This is not to say that the precedent's reasoning has nothing to do with the degree of its binding
power. A precedent whose reasoning is patently erroneous is much closer to being subject to overruling than one
whose reasoning is viewed as sound. As Professor Monaghan has argued, stare decisis is a "conditional obligation:
precedent binds absent a showing of substantial countervailing considerations." Monaghan, supranote 6, at 757.
23. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
24. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
25. Id. at 153.
26. See, e.g., Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
27.

See RONALDDWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAw: THE MORAL READING OFTHE AmERICAN CONSTITUTION 117

(1996) (stating that Casey's outcome "was a great surprise").
28. Casey, 505 U.S. at 853; see also id. at 861 ("Within the bounds of normal stare decisis analysis.. the
stronger argument is for affirming Roe's central holding, with whatever degree of personal reluctance any of us may
have, not for overruling it.").
29. See infra notes 162-172 and accompanying text (explaining Rule of Law values and how stare decisis
advances those values).
30. Casey, 505 U.S. at 860-61, 869.
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In current practice, the role of precedent in constitutional adjudication is
relatively clear. As Professor Henry Monaghan has stated, in constitutional
adjudication "the conventional wisdom is that stare decisis should and does have
only limited application. 31 The binding power of constitutional precedents is lower
than that of statutory or common law precedents because of the great difficulty of
eliminating an incorrect constitutional precedent through nonjudicial means.32
Although not always consistent, the Court's rhetoric33 is that it will follow incorrect
constitutional precedents absent a "special justification" otherwise.34 While the
exact contours of what constitutes a "special justification" are disputed by members
of the Court, only Justice Thomas advocates giving little or no deference to
incorrect constitutional precedent.35
Turning to the normative aspect of stare decisis, proponents of stare decisis have
identified a number of values that it advances.36 Here I will briefly outline them.
First, proponents argue, based on different philosophical structures, 3 7 that the
doctrine of stare decisis promotes fairness and equality by "treating like cases
alike. 3 8 Second, proponents argue that stare decisis advances predictability by
31. Monaghan, supra note 6, at 741; see also Lee, supra note 2, at 703--04 ("[O]ne point has achieved an
unusual degree of consensus: that stare decisis has 'great weight.. .in the area of statutory construction' but 'is at
its weakest' in constitutional cases."); Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis andDemonstrably Erroneous Precedent,87
VA. L. REv. 1, 2 (2001) ("[C]onventional wisdom now maintains that a purported demonstration of error is not
enough to justify overruling a past decision.").
32. See Bumet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,406-10 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (arguing
that because "correction through legislative action is practically impossible," the Court should more readily overrule
incorrect constitutional precedents), overruled in part by Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376
(1938); see also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) ("ISitare decisis concerns are at their acme in cases
involving property and contract rights."); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989)
("Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation....").
33. See Lee, supra note 2, at 654 ("The modern Court has sent conflicting signals as to the effect of a
current perception of error in a past decision.").
34. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,443 (2000); United States v. IBM Corp., 517 U.S. 843,
856 (1996); see also Richard W. Murphy, Separationof Powersand the HorizontalForceofPrecedent,78 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1075, 1086 (2003) ("Mhe Supreme Court treats its past decisions as neither absolutely binding nor
merely persuasive."). There are many statements by the Court that take a different approach. See, e.g., Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-29 (1991) (listing factors the Court must weigh to determine whether to overrule
a precedent); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 101 (1978) (appealing to the "lessons of experience" to overrule
a precedent) (internal quotation marks omitted).
35. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Until this
Court replaces its existing Commerce Clause Jurisprudence with a standard more consistent with the original
understanding, we will continue to see Congress appropriating state police powers."); see also United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584-85, 601 & n.8 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Consideration of staredecisis and
reliance interests may convince us that we cannot wipe the slate clean.") (second emphasis added).
36. See Alexander, supra note 14, at 9-17; James C. Rehnquist, The Power That Shall Be Vested in a
Precedent: StareDecisis, the Constitutionand the Supreme Court, 66 B.U.L. REv. 345,347-48 (1986); Schauer,
supra note 12, at 595-602.
37. See, e.g., RANDYE. BARNETr, THE STRUCTUREOFLIBERTY:JUSICEANDTHE RULE OF LAW 127 (1998)

(arguing, from a "liberal conception ofjustice," that "the rule-of-law doctrine of precedent imposes a presumptive
duty on the courts to adhere to [previously enunciated legal rules]"); CLIFFORD ANGELL BATES, JR., ARISTOTLE'S
"BEST REGIME": KINGSHIP, DEMOCRACY, ANDTHE RULEOFLAW 163-211 (2003) (arguing that Aristotle, in Book

III of his Politics,establishes that "democracy restrained by the rule of law is the best regime"); RiCHARD KRAUT,
ARISTOTLE: POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 455 (2002) ("Books IV-VI [of the Politics]make it clear that Aristotle accepts
in large part the argument rehearsed in Book 1I for the rule of law."); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 208-09
(rev. ed. 1999) (arguing, from a conception of justice as fairness, that the Rule of Law requires "similar cases be
treated similarly").
38. Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis as a ConstitutionalRequirement, 104 W. VA. L. REv. 43, 108 (2001);
Schauer, supra note 12, at 595-97. For criticism of the claim that stare decisis advances equality, see Alexander,
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"ensur[ing] that the judiciary follows known rules [and] does not make arbitrary
decisions."39 Predictability enables persons to order their lives into the future. Third,
following precedent respects the reliance interests of those who have justifiably
relied on precedents.4" The fourth value of stare decisis claimed by its proponents
is stability.4 ' Fifth, stare decisis promotes the systemic legitimacy of the federal
courts, particularly the Supreme Court, which plays a central role in our society's
social order.4 2 Lastly, stare decisis makes judicial decision making more efficient.43
Because of stare decisis, "[miany constitutional issues are so far settled that they are
simply off the agenda."" By allowing judges (and potential and actual litigants) to
concentrate on one or a handful of issues in a given case, instead of relitigating all
potential issues in a case, stare decisis promotes judicial efficiency.
Many of these values are often seen as components of the larger cluster of values
that comprise the Rule of Law. Of course, the extent to which these related Rule of
Law values are advanced depends on the constraining force of precedent. And to the
extent these Rule of Law values are advanced, other contrary values, such as
flexibility, are often sacrificed.
B. The Division Over the ProperMethod of ConstitutionalInterpretationin the
United States
The United States has the oldest binding, written, national constitution. Until
recently, the power of constitutional judicial review exercised by federal courts was
also a unique American institution.45 Constitutional judicial review is the authority
of federal courts4 6 to nullify acts of the elected branches47 of government because
those acts are not in accord with the Constitution.
The combination of an authoritative, written constitution and the power of
constitutional judicial review has sparked a continuing debate over the methodology
federal courts should use to interpret the Constitution. There are, generally
speaking, two camps in American judicial and scholarly discourse. On one end are

supra note 14, at 9-13. Professor Alexander argues: "[T]here is no intertemporal equality value of sufficient weight
to support precedential constraint." Id. at 10.
39. WHITINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at 169; see Healy, supranote 38, at
108.
40. Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1553-56; Schauer, supra note 12, at 599. Persons inevitably order their lives
based on the legal rules enunciated in previous cases and could suffer harm if those rules are regularly or lightly
changed.
41. WHITrINGTON, CoNSTITUTIoNALINTERPRETATON, supra note 5,at 169; Lee, supranote 2, at 652-53.
Stability is the value of limited change. Stability does not require change to cease-it requires only that change be
gradual, allowing social life to accommodate the change.
42. Monaghan, supra note 6, at 749-54.
43. WHITrINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at 169; Healy, supra note 38, at
108-09.
44. Monaghan, supra note 6, at 744; see Lee, supra note 2, at 652. But see Paulsen, supra note 2, at
1544-45 (questioning the efficiency gains brought about by any form of stare decisis that is less than absolute).
45. Keith E. Whittington,An "IndispensableFeature"? ConstitutionalismandJudicial Review, 6 N.Y.U.
J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 21, 22 (2003).

46. And state courts, but in this Article I will concentrate on federal courts exercising constitutional judicial
review.
47. For purposes of this Article, I will concentrate on the paradigm situation of federal courts reviewing the
constitutionality of a federal statute, duly enacted and signed by the President.
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those commonly labeled originalists; on the other end are nonoriginalists. I will
discuss each in turn.
1. Originalism
Originalists argue that the authoritative and binding meaning of the
Constitution-the meaning that federal courts may legitimately use to nullify acts
of the elected branches-is the publicly understood meaning of the text of the
Constitution when the text was ratified. Originalists have advanced many, at times
conflicting, reasons why the original meaning of
the text of the Constitution is
48
authoritative, which I have discussed elsewhere.
For example, the Commerce Clause is a modern locus of debate over the meaning
of the Constitution, and it provides a convenient vehicle to examine an originalist
approach to constitutional interpretation. The original Constitution, ratified
1787-1789, contained the Commerce Clause, which gave Congress the power "[t]o
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the
Indian tribes."49 The Clause was enacted to give the federal government the
authority to prevent the interstate (and international) squabbles over commerce that
had threatened to tear apart the Union under the Articles of Confederation, which
had failed to give Congress such authority.5"
An originalist judge, when faced with a challenge to a statute passed by Congress
pursuant to its Commerce Clause power, will ask himself, is this statute regulating
"Commerce" as that term was understood in 1789?51 To answer the question, the
originalist judge will look to the text and structure of the Constitution; for example,
how is "Commerce" used elsewhere in the Constitution? If that does not resolve the
constitutional question in the case, the judge will look to historical evidence of how
that term was understood by the Framers and Ratifiers of the Constitution in
1787-1789.52 Such evidence may include the literature that accumulated during the
ratification debates, such as the FederalistPapers;usage in private correspondence
discussing the Constitution; contemporary dictionaries; and usage in other areas of
life. Through this essentially historical inquiry, the originalist judge will also seek

48. Lee J. Strang, The Clash of Rival and IncompatiblePhilosophicalTraditions Within Constitutional
Interpretation:Originalismandthe AristotelianTradition, 2 GEo. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 523,523-24,574-98 (2004)
[hereinafter Strang, Aristotelian Tradition];Lee J. Strang, Originalismand Legitimacy, I I KANSAS J.L. & PUB.

POL'Y 657, 658 (2002) [hereinafter Strang, Legitimacy].
49. U.S. CONST. art. L § 8, cl.
3.
50. THE FEDERALIST No.7 (Alexander Hamilton).

The few simple words of the Commerce Clause.. reflected a central concern of the Framers that
was an immediate reason for calling the Constitutional Convention: the conviction that in order
to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization
that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of
Confederation.
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979).
51. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 528, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (urging a return to
the original meaning of the Commerce Clause); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584-602 (1995) (Thomas,
J., concurring) (urging the same).
52. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2229-30 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The Clause's text,
structure, and history all indicate that, at the time of the founding, the term 'commerce' consisted of selling, buying,

and bartering, as well as transporting....") (internal quotation marks omitted).
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to become aware of the purpose for which the Commerce Clause was ratified. 3 This
purpose aids the judge in determining the contours of the meaning of the Clause.
If the originalist judge finds that the original meaning of the Commerce Clause
is determinate in the case before him---that is, the original meaning of the Clause
determines the outcome of the case-the judge must rule based upon that meaning.
However, despite the best efforts of the originalist judge, it is possible that the
original meaning of the term "Commerce" is underdetermined on the point before
the court. Perhaps the challenged statute is regulating an activity that is not
determinately included in or excluded from the original meaning of "Commerce."
In other words, there is a range of possible legal outcomes consistent with, but not
determined by, the original meaning. Those originalist scholars who have recognized that the original meaning may be underdetermined5 4 have arrived at different
conclusions regarding the duty of a judge when faced with underdeterminacy.55
Most originalists, including myself, argue thatjudges may not exercise the power
of constitutional judicial review to rule that a federal statute is unconstitutional
based upon anything other than the original meaning of the text of the Constitution.
Consequently, when the original meaning determines the outcome of a
constitutional
case, judges may not directly appeal to or rule based upon natural law
56
norms.

For example, Justice Scalia, the most prominent originalistjurist, has argued that
originalist judges should not interpret the Constitution to mean "what it ought to
mean" in light of philosophy and justice.57 Instead, because the Constitution is a
"democratically adopted text," it must be understood as it was by the Framers and
Ratifiers who gave the Constitution its authority.58 More recently, Keith
Whittington has argued that judges directly applying natural law norms "cannot fit
with the experience of possessing a constitution at all."59 More fundamentally,
Whittington finds that the "recommendation to pursue a dimly perceived [natural
law] truth... erases the distinction between the legal and the political realm and once

53. For an example of this methodology in action regarding the Commerce Clause, see Justice Thomas's
concurrence in Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring).
54.

See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis:CritiquingCriticalDogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.

462, 473 (1987) (providing a discussion of the nature and extent of underdeterminacy).
55. See, e.g., BARNETT, supra note 11, at 118-30 (2004); KEITH E. WHTTrINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 1-19 (1999) [hereinafter WHITINGTON,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION]; WHTTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at 34-212.

My thoughts on this subject are discussed in Lee J. Strang, The Role of the Common Good in Legal and
ConstitutionalInterpretation,3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 48 (2006) [hereinafter Strang, Role of the Common Good].
56. This Article argues that judges may directly exercise their prudential judgment on what the natural law
requires in a particular case-what the common good requires-in the context of nonoriginalist precedent.
57. SCALIA, supra note 15, at 39. Robert Bork, another prominent originalist, agrees with Justice Scalia:
"I am far from denying that there is a natural law, but I do deny both that we have given judges the authority to
enforce it and that judges have any greater access to that law than do the rest of us." ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 66 (1990).
58. SCALIA, supra note 15, at 40; see also id. at 133 ("[W]hether life-tenured judges are free to revise
statutes and constitutions adopted by the people and their representatives is... [a] question utterly central to the
existence of democratic government.").
59. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at 31.
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again calls into question the authority of the jurist when opposed to the judgments
of more representative political agents."' °
In sum, originalists argue that federal courts are justified in striking down the
acts of the elected branches only when such acts conflict with the determinate
original meaning of the Constitution. Judges may not rule, when the original
meaning is determinate, based upon norms outside of the original meaning.
2. Nonoriginalism
Although a large and varied group, nonoriginalists generally agree that values
other than (or in addition to) the original meaning should enter into a judge's
interpretative calculus when deciding whether to declare an act of the elected
branches unconstitutional. However, there is a broad range of views in the
nonoriginalist camp on what role, if any, the original meaning should play.
Some nonoriginalist scholars and judges argue that the original meaning should
play no role; rather, the morally correct set of values should comprise our
Constitution and should guide constitutional judicial review. Richard Epstein, who
has argued for a Constitution that embodies Lockean principles in its text and
presupposes a Lockean theory of the state, articulates an example of this line of
thinking.6 Another example is Samuel Freeman,6 2 who believes that the only
legitimate government is based on "public reasons," meaning that judges must
interpret the Constitution to embody "the terms of our social agreement, terms to
which all as 'free and equal sovereign citizens' would reasonably agree."63
On the other end of the spectrum are nonoriginalists for whom the original
meaning of the Constitution plays a role. Perhaps the most prominent example is
Ronald Dworkin.' For Dworkin, any interpretation of the Constitution must "fit"
our constitutional practice, the central component of which is a written
constitution.65 Thus, any interpretative methodology that fails to account for appeals
to and decisions based upon the Constitution will also fail to "fit" our constitutional
practice and should be excluded as a possible interpretative methodology. However,
since more than one interpretative methodology will fit the data of our
constitutional practice, Dworkin argues that we, both as individuals and as a society,
must choose the morally best methodology, which is the one that does the most
credit to our society. 66 This choice is relatively unconstrained and judges must
utilize moral norms in making those decisions. Dworkin argues that it is his "moral
reading" of the Constitution that both fits and does the most credit to our

60. Id. at 32.
61.

RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY ANDTHE POWER OFEMINENT DOMAIN (1985). For

Epstein, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment takes on enormous importance relative to the other portions
of the Constitution. Id. at 3.
62. Samuel Freeman, OriginalMeaning, DemocraticInterpretation,andthe Constitution,21 PHIL. &PUB.

AFF. 3 (1992).
63.
64.
DWORKIN,
65.

Strang, Legitimacy, supra note 48, at 664 (quoting Freeman, supra note 62, at 14).
For what is arguably Dworkin's best discussion of interpretation of human practices, see RONALD
LAW'S EMPIRE 52-53, 228-32 (1986).
See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 106 ("[Hercules' interpretation of the Constitution]

must be a scheme that fits the particular rules of this constitution, of course.").
66. Id. at 107.
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constitutional practice.67 The "moral reading" commits judges to ensuring that our
nation treats all citizens with "equal status and with equal concern" as required by
the Bill of Rights--especially the Equal Protection Clause.68
In sum, nonoriginalists are a diverse group of scholars and judges who reject
originalism and argue that judges should utilize values instead of or in addition to
the original meaning during constitutional judicial review.
C. ForAny Plausible Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation,There Will Be
Precedents That, Under the Methodology, Are Mistakes
1. Why There Are Always Mistakes
Every plausible 69 constitutional interpretative methodology must account for
what, on that methodology's understanding, are mistaken precedents. I will briefly
discuss some of the reasons for the existence of mistaken constitutional precedent.
The practice of constitutional judicial review in the United States is old, deep,
and rich. For over 200 years, the Supreme Court has been ruling statutes unconstitutional.7° This vast span of time presents great difficulties for any institution that
requires the exercise of fallible human judgment for its functioning. Over time,
mistakes will inevitably occur regardless of one's interpretative methodology.
Relatedly, the central institution in the practice of constitutional judicial review
is the Supreme Court. The Court has periodic changes in personnel, appointed and
approved by political actors whose jurisprudential views have varied over the vast
span of the Court's existence. These personnel changes bring new views on the
correctness of past precedents, which in turn were based on different understandings
of the nature of the Constitution. For example, between 1948 and 2000, the party
affiliation of the president changed seven times. Each change brought with it

67. DWORKIN, supra note 3 1, at 2.
68. Id. at 10. For an argument that the text and history of the Constitution play a role only when convenient
for Dworkin, see Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in JudicialReview: A Comment on Ronald
Dworkin's "Moral Reading" of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1269 (1997).

69. The only possible (though not plausible) method of interpreting the Constitution that does not have a
difficulty with mistaken precedent would be one that identified the Constitution entirely with what the Supreme
Court says about the Constitution. Of course, if one's interpretative methodology is "whatever the Supreme Court
rules is correct," then mistakes will not occur. I am aware of no judge or scholar who holds this view. As Randy
Barnett has argued, scholars and judges are unwilling to argue (admit?) that Supreme Court pronouncements are
the Constitution. BARNETT, supra note 11, at 1-2. Scholars and judges continue to assert in their writings and

opinions that it is the Constitution that is authoritative, and not solely the Supreme Court's pronouncements
regarding the Constitution. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428,440 (2000) (stating that "Miranda

is constitutionally based"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (stating that "specific guarantees
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance," including a "zone of privacy"); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL

REvmw 88-101 (1980) (arguing that the Constitution's text supports a "representation-reinforcing approach to
judicial review"); Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in SCALIA, supra note 15, at 115, 119-20 (stating that a semantic
originalist would look to the "best understanding" of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause as laying down

"an abstract principle forbidding whatever punishments are in fact cruel and unusual"). Further, an interpretative
methodology that completely identified the Constitution with Supreme Court precedent could not account for the
persistent arguments in the precedents themselves to the written Constitution, its original meaning, and other
constitutional values. In other words, such an interpretative methodology would fail to adequately fit our

constitutional practice.
70. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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presidents with different views on the nature of the Constitution and the role of the
Supreme Court.7 In turn, the presidents attempted to appoint justices in line with
their views.72 The result is a slow change in the jurisprudential views of members
of the Court.
Additionally, the general current of legal thought has changed over the course of
the Court's history.73 Judges were first lawyers who came of age in a particular
jurisprudential climate. As young law students (or, in an earlier era, legal
apprentices), they imbibed the understanding of law presented to them.74
Accordingly, as new judges replace old, the legal views of the judges--especially
with respect to past cases-change as well.
Further, what Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in 1835 is more pertinent than ever:
"There is almost no political question in the United States that is not resolved
sooner or later into a judicial question. 75 For a substantial period of its history, the
Supreme Court has waded into the most contentious issues in our social life
including racial issues, economic issues, abortion, euthanasia, and religion in public
life. These issues cause emotions to run high and implicate our most deeply held
beliefs. This could impair the judgment of judges as to whether and/or how the
Constitution is implicated. Some may be tempted to rule in a manner they know is

71. This statement depends on the political affiliation of the presidents guiding their choice of Supreme
Court nominees and the political affiliation of the presidents having different views ofthe nature of the Constitution
and the role of the Supreme Court.
72. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 210 (2001) ("[The fact is that chief executives who
have been sensible of the broad powers they possessed, and who have been willing to exercise those powers, have
all but invariably tried to have some influence on the philosophy of the Court through their appointments to that
body."). Perhaps the most important battle over the ability of a president to influence the makeup of the Court was
President Roosevelt's court-packing plan. See id. at 116-33 (describing Roosevelt's failed attempts to deliberately
alter the makeup of the Court to ensure implementation of the New Deal); see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 285 (3d ed. 2005) (noting that the Supreme Court's reversal of itself in the Legal
Tender Cases as a result of presidential appointments "shows how much control a president could exercise over
the Supreme Court").
73. See MORTON J. HORwrTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF
LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992) (describing the transformation from legal formalism to legal realism in American legal
thought).
74. One of the most prominent examples of this phenomenon occurred at the turn of the twentieth century.
Legal thought at the end of the nineteenth century was exemplified by Dean Langdell of Harvard who sought to
remake legal education and practice into a science based on empirical study of case law. C.C. LANGDELL,
SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAw OF CONTRACTS (1871). Langdell stated, "Law, considered as a science, consists
of certain principles or doctrines. To have such a mastery of these as to be able to apply them with constant facility
and certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer." Id. at vi. This
understanding of law is commonly called "Legal Formalism." For example, at Harvard Law School in 2002-2003,
at least three courses labeled the predominant strain of American legal thought in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries legal formalism. See HARVARD LAW SCHOOL CATALOG 2002-2003, at 103, 162, 194 (2002).
Beginning, however, around the time of Oliver Wendell Holmes, a new movement in the American law schools
called "Legal Realism" emerged. See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,
460-61 (1897) ("The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean
by the law."). See generallyBrian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Towarda NaturalizedJurisprudence,76 TEX.
L. REV. 267 (1997) (providing a broad overview of the legal realist movement). Over time, students who came of
age under the tutelage of realists became judges who replaced formalist judges. The result was a large repudiation
of past case law beginning, at least symbolically, in 1937. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1 (1937) (beginning the sea change of Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
75. ALEXIS DETOCQUEVLLE, DEMOCRACY INAMERICA 257 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds.,
trans., Univ. of Chi. 2000) (1840).
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not in accord with what the Constitution requires. Others may unknowingly be
swayed. In either case, mistaken precedent is created.
Lastly, the interpretative issues faced by the Supreme Court are not easy. Judges
must both identify the pertinent constitutional meaning and then determine whether
the government action in question contravenes that meaning. Well-intentioned,
intelligent judges can err in making these determinations and thereby create a
mistaken precedent.
2. The Problem of Mistaken Nonoriginalist Precedent
A common criticism lodged by nonoriginalists against originalism is that
adoption of originalism would require the overruling of cases that are both just and
widely accepted by society. The paradigm example of such a case is Brown v.
Board of Education.76 In this vein, Professor Michael Gerhardt has argued that
"[u]nitary theories," like originalism, "face an inescapable dilemma." Originalists
"have to choose between rejecting most of [the Supreme Court's] precedents,
thereby precipitating constitutional turmoil, or rejecting or seriously modifying the
proposed unitary theory to ensure stability or continuity in constitutional decisionmaking."' 77 This dilemma comes from originalism's single, unifying principle: the
"original meaning" coming into conflict with cases decided based upon reasons
other than the original meaning.78
For originalists, the list of nonoriginalist precedents and constitutional law
doctrines built on these precedents is long and presents a strong challenge to
originalism. Additionally, these nonoriginalist precedents remain some of the most
controversial Supreme Court decisions in our nation's history. Nonoriginalist
precedents that have been criticized on originalist grounds include Brown v. Board
ofEducation,7 9 which held that racially segregated public schools violated the Equal
Protection Clause; Roe v. Wade"° (and its progeny), which held that laws prohibiting
abortion violated the Due Process Clause; Everson v. Board of Education,8 which
held that the Establishment Clause incorporated a principle of strong separation
between church and state; free speech cases;82 Wickardv. Filburn,83 which held that
Congress's Commerce Clause power extended to wheat grown and consumed on a
farm; nondelegation doctrine cases;8 and the incorporation doctrine,85 among many

76. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
77. Gerhardt, supra note 7, at 132.
78. Id. at 131-34.
79. 374 U.S. 483 (1954).
80. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
81. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
82. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that burning the United States flag was
constitutionally protected from prosecution); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (holding that
attorneys have a constitutional right to advertise their services); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (reversing,
on First Amendment grounds, the conviction of defendant who wore a "F[***] the Draft" shirt in a county
courthouse in violation of a state statute which forbade "maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet
of any neighborhood or person [by] offensive conduct"); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that
states may not criminalize private possession of obscene materials).
83. 317U.S. 111 (1942).
84. See United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992, 1010-11 (3d Cir. 1988) (listing cases).
85. The Incorporation Doctrine holds that some rights protected by the original Bill of Rights have been
incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
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others. This list of nonoriginalist precedents and doctrines, though not close to
exhaustive, shows that, if the originalist account of constitutional interpretation is
to be plausible, originalists must explain the status of these precedents and
doctrines. In other words, "the central problem for originalism is whether the cost
of embracing stare decisis is too high-whether, in the end, the embrace destroys
'86 Unfortunately, few originalists have directly faced the issue and
originalism[ ].
many have simply asserted that some/many/all nonoriginalist doctrines and
precedents should not or cannot be overturned.87
Further, some forms of originalism are especially subject to criticism based on
the existence of pervasive nonoriginalist precedent. Richard Kay, an early
proponent of originalism, argued that originalism was the best mode of
constitutional interpretation because it was the "most likely to produce relatively
clear and stable rules for lawful government activity. 88 For Kay, originalism
protected Rule of Law values better than alternative interpretative methodologies.89
But if stability is the justification for originalism, then nonoriginalist precedent
presents a quandary. On the one hand, an originalist judge that overrules all
nonoriginalist precedent will gravely harm the Rule of Law values upon which
originalism is based (according to Kay). On the other hand, the originalistjudge that
fails to overrule any nonoriginalist precedent and instead rules consistently with
such precedent is an originalist in name only. However, the originalist judge who
decides to overrule some but not all nonoriginalist precedent is, from Kay's
perspective, the worst of all because of the dramatic instability and unpredictability
introduced by ajudge deciding case-by-case and doctrine-by-doctrine when to abide
by, or overrule, nonoriginalist precedent.
Similarly, Justice Scalia has argued that originalism is the proper interpretative
methodology because, among other reasons, it is more objective than any
alternative: one may in principle determine the original meaning of the Constitution
through historical study.' Admitting that there "is plenty of room for disagreement
as to what [the] original meaning was," Scalia finds that "the difficulties and uncertainties of determining original meaning and applying it to modern circumstances
are negligible compared with the difficulties and uncertainties of [nonoriginalism]." 9 1
Justice Scalia's defense of originalism based on its objectivity founders,
however, on the shoals of pervasive nonoriginalist precedent; that is, unless the
originalist judge is willing to "wipe the slate clean" of nonoriginalist precedent,
which few, if any, judges have expressed a willingness to do. If the originalist judge
is going to decide on a case-by-case or doctrine-by-doctrine basis whether to overrule nonoriginalist precedent, the criticisms lodged by Scalia against nonoriginalism
-that it is not objective-apply to originalism as well.

86. Monaghan, supra note 6, at 767.
87. See infra Part II.D. (discussing current originalist approaches to nonoriginalist precedent).
88. Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the OriginalIntentionsin ConstitutionalAdjudication:Three Objections
and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 226, 288 (1988).
89. See id. at 287-91.
90. SCALIA, supra note 15, at 44-47; see also BORK, supra note 57, at 143-53 (arguing that originalism
is superior because with it judges can neutrally derive, define, and apply constitutional norms).
91. SCALIA, supra note 15, at45.
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While there is much nonoriginalist precedent, I do not want to overstate the
problem of nonoriginalist precedent for originalists.92 First, most cases decided by
federal courts are not constitutional cases and hence would not be impacted by the
overruling of nonoriginalist constitutional precedent. Second, there are many
instances when the original meaning of the text of the Constitution will be underdetermined; that is, two or more results are consistent with the original meaning. In
these situations, the Supreme Court has no authority to strike down a statute in the
first instance, so a shift by the Court away from nonoriginalist precedent may not
impact existing constitutional constructions.9 3 "Thus, an originalist judiciary...
would not strike down every government action that cannot be justified in
originalist terms but only those that are inconsistent with known constitutional
requirements. 94
Third, instead of simply overruling a nonoriginalist case, the Supreme Court can
initially limit the case, employ an originalist methodology that will further limit the
nonoriginalist case, and eventually, once thejurisprudential landscape has changed,
overrule the case.95 As Keith Whittington has argued, this process protects reliance
interests, allows society to slowly move with the Court, and prepares individuals
and social institutions for the eventual overruling of the nonoriginalist case or
doctrine.96
Randy Barnett has offered two further possible ways in which the nonoriginalist
precedent critique is limited: (1) the "epistemic" role precedent plays for later
judges, and (2) "original ambiguities" where early precedent may fix "indeterminacy of original meaning."97 The first permits the "Court to give its past decisions
a rebuttable presumption of correctness. 98 The second would permit an early
decision to "rectif[y] an initial indeterminacy in original meaning" that later courts
could not trump. 99
While nonoriginalists often use the existence of nonoriginalist precedent as a
club against originalists, 1°° each interpretative methodology is faced with the
problem of mistaken precedent. Nonoriginalist theories of constitutional interpretation also must account for precedents and doctrines that are justified by the original
meaning of the Constitution but not by the nonoriginalist' s methodology. The list
of originalist precedents often criticized by nonoriginalists includes Alden v.
Maine,"' which held that Congress could not abrogate state immunity from suit in

92. WHrrriNGTON, CONSTUTIONALINTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at 168-74; see also Randy E. Barnett,
Trumping Precedentwith OriginalMeaning: Not as Radicalas It Sounds, 23 CONST. COMMENT. (forthcoming
2006) (providing a persuasive argument about the limits of the common critique lodged by nonoriginalists based
on the existence of pervasive and deeply entrenched nonoriginalist precedent).
93. WHrFINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supranote 5, at 171-73.
94. Id. at 172.
95. Id. at 169-70.
96. Id. at 170.
97. Barnett, supra note 92 (manuscript at 10-11, on file with author).
98. Id. (manuscript at 10, on file with author) (citing Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the
Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 81 (2000)).
99. Id. (manuscript at 11, on file with author) (citing Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive
Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 519, 525-53 (2003)).
100. See supra note 6 (citing such instances).
101. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
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state court, and United States v. Lopez, °2 which held that Congress's Commerce
Clause power did not extend to noneconomic activity. And then there is the
pervasive aspect of our legal practice of making arguments based on the original
meaning of the Constitution.° 3 Consequently, the problem of "mistaken precedent"
is one for both originalists and nonoriginalists.
D. Some CurrentOriginalistApproaches to Mistaken NonoriginalistPrecedent
1. Originalist Theories of Precedent
In this subsection I will discuss some of the theories of precedent offered by
originalists. There are few attempts among originalists to address nonoriginalist
precedent and, of those that do, most provide little support for their respective
claims. The positions advanced by originalists cover the entire range of possibilities
from essentially following the current practice regarding precedent to overruling all
nonoriginalist precedent.
a. Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia has a strong concept of precedent. He has stated that for those
nonoriginalist areas of constitutional law where "the Court has developed longstanding and well-accepted principles.. .that are effectively irreversible," he will
abide by nonoriginalist precedent, but not extend them.'0 To justify his acceptance
of nonoriginalist precedent, Justice Scalia believes that for originalism to be
practical, it "must accommodate the doctrine of stare decisis."'10 5 Therefore,
according to Justice Scalia, the basis for stare decisis, and thus for originalism's
accommodation of mistaken nonoriginalist precedent, is stability. ° Overturning all
nonoriginalist precedent would be "so disruptive of the established state of things"
that it would disqualify originalism "as a workable prescription for judicial
governance."' 07
108
In short, Justice Scalia carves out of his originalist methodology an exception
for some, but not all, nonoriginalist precedent. In doing so, he appeals to stability,
but fails to offer any reason why stare decisis should be an exception to originalism.

102. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
103. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1947) ("The meaning and scope of the First
Amendment, preventing establishment of religion.. .[is construed] in light of its history and the evils it was
designed forever to suppress...."); see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) ("The Court's
interpretation of the Establishment Clause has comported with what history reveals was the contemporaneous
understanding of its guarantees."). None other than Justice Brennan has relied on and claimed consistency with
the historical understanding of the Establishment Clause. See Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 294 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("I believe that the line we must draw between the permissible and the
impermissible is one which accords with history and faithfully reflects the understanding of the Founding
Fathers.").
104. ScAuA, supra note 6, at 138.
105. Id. at 139.
106. Id. He further argues that this concession is not a unique flaw of originalism, since, like all interpretive
methods, it must compromise with "mistaken" precedent. Id.
107. Id. at 139.
108. Id. at 140 ("[S]taredecisis is not part of my originalist philosophy; it is a pragmatic exception to it.").
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Nor does he explain how an originalist judge should approach nonoriginalist
precedent, namely, when the judge should overrule, limit, distinguish, or affirm.
b. Robert Bork
After Justice Scalia, Robert Bork is likely the second most known originalist. In
his book, The Tempting of America, Bork responded to criticism that originalism is
fatally flawed because of the prevalence of nonoriginalist precedent. °9 Bork argued
that originalist judges should "not attempt to undo all mistakes of the past."' " When
faced with nonoriginalist precedent that a judge prudentially determines not to
overrule, Bork asserted that the judge should generally limit the precedent and
extend it no further."1'
Bork justified originalist judges limiting or overruling nonoriginalist precedent
by citing to the Court's practice of overruling decisions later determined to be
incorrect." 2 Bork found that this practice is appropriate because of the difficulty of
amending the Constitution to overrule erroneous Supreme Court decisions." 3 He
also appealed to the values that stare decisis is typically said to uphold: protection
of reliance interests and stability." 4
However, Bork went further than offering only prudential reasons for stare
decisis. He also briefly noted that "[a]t the time of the ratification, judicial power
was known to be to some degree confined by an obligation to respect precedent." ' 5
This originalist "hook" allowed Bork to avoid some of the criticisms lodged against
Scalia.
c. Anastasoff v. United States
In Anastasoff v. United States,"6 a panel of the Eighth Circuit held that the
circuit's rule that opinions designated as unpublished were not of precedential value
violated Article Il.17 Anastasoff, written by Judge Richard Arnold, employed an
originalist methodology to determine that, at the time of the framing and ratification
of Article IR, a doctrine of binding precedent was "well established" and derived
"from the nature of judicial power delegated to the courts by Article MI." ' 8
To reach this conclusion, Judge Arnold reviewed the historical context of 1789
to arrive at the Framers' and Ratifiers' understanding of the nature of judicial
power." 9 The court in Anastasoff concluded that, "as the Framers intended, the
doctrine of precedent limits the 'judicial Power' delegated to courts in Article
' 120 The
1I.'
doctrine of precedent, as understood by the Framers and Ratifiers, was

109. BORK, supra note 57, at 155-59.
110. Id. at 155.
111. Id. at 158.
112. Id. at 156.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 157-58.
115. Id. at 157.
116. 223 F.3d 898, vacated as moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
117. Id. at 899.
118. Id. at 900.
119. Id. at 900-03.
120. Id. at 903. Anastasoff caused a firestorm of debate in the courts and academic community. The most
prominent judicial response to Anastasoffcame from the Ninth Circuit in Hart v. Massanari,266 F.3d 1155 (9th
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not, however, "some rigid doctrine of eternal adherence to precedents," and courts
may, for good reason(s), overrule past decisions. 2 '
In the context of constitutional adjudication, Anastasoff s conclusion that
"judicial Power" in Article Imincorporated the doctrine of precedent would lead to
the result that courts should not overrule all nonoriginalist precedent. However, the
court failed to give reasons why and guidance as to when mistaken nonoriginalist
precedent should and should not be overruled.
d. Gary Lawson
In a provocative 1994 article entitled The ConstitutionalCaseAgainstPrecedent,
Gary Lawson argued that in the context of constitutional adjudication, "the practice
of treating prior judicial decisions as legally authoritative merely by virtue of their
status as prior judicial decisions" was unconstitutional. 2 Lawson's was the first
article by an originalist to directly address (and attack) the bindingness of
nonoriginalist constitutional precedent.
Lawson first discussed the Marbury v. Madison'23 justification for constitutional
judicial review: in a case involving the constitutionality of a statute, the Court must
prefer the Constitution-the supreme law of the land-to the statute. 124 This same
reasoning applies, argued Lawson, to a conflict between the Constitution and a prior
of Marbury, the
Supreme Court case: "Is there any doubt that, under the reasoning
25
court must choose the Constitution over the prior decision?"'
Lawson thereafter explicitly rejected the argument that "judicial Power" in
Article I included the power of later federal courts to give "legal effect to
prior.. .decisions."' 126 He stated that "'[t]he judicial Power' is fundamentally the
case-deciding power" requiring that judges know the "hierarchical order of [legal]
sources in the event of a conflict."' 27 Lawson concluded that for the same reasons
the Constitution trumps statutes or executive action, the Constitution also trumps
priorjudicial decisions.12 Contrary to Lawson, I will show that some nonoriginalist
precedent should not be overruled because of the normative justification

Cir. 2001). Judge Kozinski found that the "more plausible view [of Article 11l] is that when federal courts rule on
cases... and generally comply with the specific constitutional commands applicable to judicial proceedings, they
have ipso facto exercised the judicial power of the United States." Id. at 1161. The court questioned the wisdom
of binding modem courts to eighteenth century understandings of judicial power and was skeptical of the ability
ofjudges to accurately discern those understandings, as opposed to enforcing the judge's own policy preferences.
Id. at 1163. In this vein, the court argued that "our concept of precedent today is far stricter than that which
prevailed at the time of the Framing." Id.; see also id. at 1163-70 (surveying the status of stare decisis prior to and
during the Ratification to conclude that the Framers did not have a "rigid form" of precedent as do courts today).
121. Anastasoff,223 F.3d at 904.
122. Lawson, supra note 2, at 25.
123. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
124. Lawson, supra note 2, at 25-27.
125. Id. at 27. The structure of Lawson's argument is simple: (1)the Constitution is the supreme law of the
land, (2) the Court must prefer the Constitution to other sources of law contrary to the Constitution, and (3) the
Court must prefer the Constitution to contrary precedents. Id. at 27-28.
126. id. at 29-30.
127. Id. at 29.
128. Id. at 30; see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, CaptainJames T. Kirk and the Enterpriseof Constitutional
Interpretation:Some Modest Proposalsfrom the Twenty-Third Century, 59 ALB. L. REV. 671, 682-86 (1995).
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undergirding a proper originalist methodology and the original meaning ofjudicial
power.
e. Randy Barnett
Randy Barnett argues in a forthcoming article that originalists must reject
nonoriginalist precedent, but that such a rejection is "not as radical as it sounds.' 29
Barnett first describes those situations where the "doctrine of precedent" is
"inconsistent with originalism": when the Court interprets the Constitution in a
manner contradicting the original meaning of the Constitution and that "mistake
was entrenched by the doctrine of precedent."' 3 ° Then he shows, correctly in my
view, how rejecting the doctrine of precedent does not lead to unacceptably harmful
consequences. 3 '
Central to Barnett's rejection of the doctrine of precedent is his normative case
for originalism itself.'32 Barnett has argued elsewhere that originalism serves the
"writtenness" of the Constitution, which in turn serves four functions: evidentiary,
cautionary, channeling, and clarifying. 133 Given his normative justification for
originalism, which is based on the beneficial effects of the Constitution's
writtenness, Barnett's normative justification cannot accommodate the doctrine of
precedent, which would undermine those effects and4 which would undermine the
3
four functions of the Constitution's "writtenness."1
My understanding of the normative justification for originalism, unlike
Barnett's, 35 since it is rooted in the common good, makes it possible-and
normatively attractive-for originalism to incorporate a doctrine of precedent.
Below I set forth my argument why.
Im. WHERE NATURAL LAW AND POSITIVE LAW MEET IN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION: AN ORIGINALIST THEORY OF
PRECEDENT
Assuming the originalist interpretative methodology I describe below, judges
should overrule nonoriginalist constitutional precedent unless doing so would
gravely harm society's pursuit of the common good. I will begin by describing the
form of and justification for originalism I have in mind. Then I will offer two
interrelated arguments for why nonoriginalist constitutional precedent should be
129. Barnett, supra note 92 (manuscript at 1, on file with author).
130. Id. (manuscript at 3, on file with author).
131. Id. (manuscript at 6-13, on file with author).
132. See id. (manuscript at 3, on file with author) ("In sum, if the normative case for originalism is
compelling, then it provides a normative argument for rejecting the doctrine of precedent, where precedent conflicts
with original meaning.").
133. BARNETr, supranote 11, at 100-01. The Constitution's writtenness also ensures that lawmaking and
application processes are just-hence, legitimate. Id. at 109-11.
134. See id. at 104 (discussing nonoriginalism and stating that it would "undermin[e] the function of its

writtenness").
135. I have elsewhere utilized Barnett's persuasive arguments regarding the writtenness of the Constitution
to support my justification for originalism. See Lee J. Strang, The Clash of Rival and Incompatible Philosophical
Traditions Within ConstitutionalInterpretation:OriginalismGrounded in the Central Western Philosophical
Tradition, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 909, 979-80 (2005) [hereinafter Strang, Central Western Philosophical
Tradition].
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overruled. First, I will show that, given the role of federal judges as guardians of the
constitutional prudential social ordering'3 6 embodied in the Constitution-which is
designed to secure the common good-and given that stare decisis advances Rule
of Law values, a normatively attractive originalism will provide that judges should
overrule nonoriginalist precedent except when doing so would gravely harm
society's pursuit of the common good.' 37
Second, I will argue that originalism does in fact incorporate constitutional stare
decisis and hence is normatively attractive. I will show that the original meaning of
III included the practice and understanding of judges
judicial power in Article
38
following precedent. 1
Finally, I will offer guidance on when such precedent should be overruled.
Because the judicial decision of when to overrule 139 nonoriginalist precedent is
underdetermined, I will briefly describe a theory of judicial virtue necessary to my
theory of precedent.
A. OriginalismGrounded in the Aristotelian Tradition
The purpose of this Article is to defend a theory of precedent within originalism.
Here, I briefly outline a form of originalism within which a defense of an originalist
theory of precedent is both possible and attractive: an originalism grounded in the
concept of the common good.
I have argued elsewhere that judges, and indeed all members of our society, are
bound by the original meaning of the text of the Constitution." 4 My argument was
grounded in the Aristotelian tradition and its understanding of the nature of man and
society. In OriginalismGrounded in the Central Western PhilosophicalTradition,
I made two arguments relevant to a theory of originalist precedent. The first is
prerogative of authority and the second isjurisdiction. Both arguments are grounded
on the common good making incorporation of a theory of originalist precedent both
possible and normatively attractive. I lay them out here in abbreviated form.
Here is the first argument: At its most basic, I believe that American society,
understood as a moral' 4 ' entity pursuing the common good through time, ratified the
Constitution and agreed to bind itself and its members to the original meaning of the
text of the Constitution. Human beings have ends, which we all strive to achieve.
Humans cannot reach their ends outside of society and thus are members of society
in order to reach their ends. Society enables its members to reach their ends by
136. By "constitutional prudential social ordering," I mean the legal ordering of persons and institutions in
our society effected by the Constitution and that the ordering was the result of our society's prudential judgment
about how best, under the circumstances, to pursue the common good. See id. at 936-81 (describing how any
society may, and how our society chose to order itself toward effective pursuit of the common good).
137. See Nelson, supra note 31, at 54-73 (discussing the costs and benefits ofa relatively weak conception
of stare decisis, such as the one I offer regarding mistaken nonoriginalist precedents).
138. In this Article I do not discuss the many implications of this conclusion. I will note, however, that many
of the dire predictions made by Judge Kozinski in Hartv. Massanari,266 F.3d 1155, 1176 (9th Cir. 2001) do not
necessarily follow. For example, even if federal courts are bound by precedent, it does not follow that courts cannot
issue summary dispositions of cases.
139. And, by implication, when a judge should limit or distinguish a mistaken precedent.
140. See Strang, Central Western PhilosophicalTradition, supra note 135.
141. Moral in the context of a society means that society can correctly pursue its end, the common good, or
it can err and incorrectly pursue (or fail entirely to pursue) the common good.
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securing the common good. But society can only do so through making an
authoritative, prudential decision to order society in a particular manner conducive
to the societal pursuit of the common good. Society can only achieve the common
good if members of the society abide by the authoritative, prudential ordering
decision. Since members of society are members for the purpose of achieving
happiness-which requires their adherence to the social ordering decision-they
must, to be rational, abide by the societal prudential ordering decision.
An authoritative determination of which path a society shall take to secure the
common good is necessary because, although all societies (purport to) pursue the
common good, what actually constitutes the common good in concrete circumstances is elusive, and, depending on the circumstances in which a society finds
itself, the paths to the common good are unclear and numerous. Both what good
constitutes the common good for a particular society and what are the most
appropriate means to the common good are rationally underdetermined: there is no
demonstrable principle of reason by which one can, a priori, order a society to the
common good and determine which means the society will utilize to achieve the
common good. As a result, an authoritative determination on social ordering is
required.
Our society made an authoritative prudential social ordering decision when it
ratified the Constitution. An essential part of that decision was that the original
meaning of the text of the Constitution would be binding. That constitutional
decision has enabled our society to effectively pursue the common good, which in
turn has enabled members of our society to achieve their ends, including members
today. Thus, individuals today are bound by the original meaning of the
Constitution.
My second argument is related to the first. Within the Aristotelian tradition,'42
how authority to govern a society is divided, and who is going to make the natural
law effective, is a prudential question settled by positive law or tradition. In our
society the constitutional settlement of 1787-1789 determined that primary lawmaking responsibilities would devolve to the legislature while the judiciary would
have "secondary" law-making authority. Thus, under the binding constitutional
settlement chosen by our society to enable us to pursue the common good, the
judiciary does not have the authority to "make law" in the primary sense, but can
only interpret and apply the positive law, which includes the Constitution.
The traditional justification for the exercise of constitutional judicial review,
found prominently in Federalist78, fits well with these two arguments. There,
Alexander Hamilton argued that constitutional judicial review was not undemocratic because the courts, in exercising that authority, acted as the agent of the People,
enforcing the People's previously enunciated constitutional limitations on the
legislature. 4 ' Constitutional judicial review, on this reading, was democracy
enhancing:it enabled the People to order its social life and constrain its government

142. By "Aristotelian tradition" I mean the philosophical tradition that has its roots in Aristotle, was
synthesized with Christianity by St. Thomas Aquinas, and continues today. See Strang, Role of the Common Good,
supra note 55, at 49 (describing the tradition).
143. THE FEDERALISTNO. 78, at 403-04 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds.,
Gideon ed. 2001).

Spring 2006]

AN ORIGINALIST THEORY OF PRECEDENT

agents into the future.'" As Hamilton stated, "[T]he courts were designed to be an
intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order... to keep the
latter within the limits assigned to their authority."' 4 5
The concept of the common good is central to both of the arguments I offered as
to why the original meaning of the Constitution is binding. In the first argument, the
authoritative, prudential, social ordering decision of our society to make the original
meaning binding was a central part of our society's attempt to order itself to
effective pursuit of the common good. In the second argument, the separation of
offices in the federal government is essential to effective pursuit of the common
good and would be thwarted if officers exceeded the prescribed authority of their
offices. The theory of precedent I offer below builds on the centrality of the
effective pursuit of the common good to originalism.
Given this justification for originalism, when the original meaning of the
Constitution is determinate, judges will have no discretion and will instead be
bound by that meaning. For example, in a case challenging Congress's Commerce
Clause authority to regulate shipment of agricultural products across state lines, a
judge is bound to rule that Congress has the Commerce Clause authority to enact
the statute, even if the judge presiding over the case believes that the statute in
question is bad policy.
However, like all language, the original meaning of the Constitution has limits.
When, as often occurs in constitutional cases, the Constitution's text and original
meaning does not provide sufficient guidance, that is, when a case is underdeternined4"' 6 by the original meaning, the court's warrant to strike down acts of the
elected branches has reached its limit. In the constitutional context, the court must
defer to the legislature's determination-or what, following other scholars, I call a
constitutional construction147-when the original meaning of the text of the
Constitution is underdetermined. Here is why: when the text of the Constitution and
its original meaning do not provide a determinate answer to a question-that is,
when there are two or more answers consistent with the original meaning-the
originalist defense of constitutional judicial review found in Federalist 78 is
inapplicable. Then, our constitutional social ordering, through Article I, gives to
Congress the authority to determine how best to order our society toward the
common good.'48

144. In the Aristotelian tradition, "democracy" is understood as a society governing and ordering itself
through time to achieve the common good. Society is "transtemporal." It is an entity existing through time and
acting for a purpose.
145. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 143, at 404. This justification was utilized by Chief Justice
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison to establish the propriety of constitutional judicial review. Marshall echoed
Hamilton stating, "That the people have an original right to establish, for their future government, such principles
as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness, is the basis, on which the whole American fabric
has been erected." 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
146. I explain the causes for legal underdeterminacy and the duty of courts in such circumstances more fully
in The Role of the Common Good in Legal and ConstitutionalInterpretation.See Strang, Role of the Common
Good, supra note 55.
147. See, e.g., BARNETT, supranote 11, at 118-30; WHrTHNGTON,CONSTIUTONALCONSTRLCTION, supra
note 55, at 1-19; WHrrrINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at 5-14.
148. This argument draws on the distinction between constitutional interpretation and constitutional
construction. Here, I follow the lead of Professors whittington and Barnett and their thoughtful discussions. In
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The Aristotelian tradition's concept of the common good offers guidance to
courts when they are faced with the underdeterminacy of legal materials. When the
law is underdetermined, the pertinent legal materials can be organized and brought
to bear in different ways in a case such that two or more outcomes are possible. The
court faced with legal underdeterminacy-with the question of "what is the law"must exercise its discretion in a manner that best enables society to effectively
pursue the common good. A court must choose that legal justificatory framework
for the legal materials that would make the area of law best able to order society
toward the common good.'49
Judges determining what the law is--deciding a case in the face of legal
underdeterminacy-must exercise the judicial virtues of justice as lawfulness and
practical wisdom
(among others).150 I further explain my understanding of judicial
5'
virtue below.'
My understanding of originalism, as detailed above, is distinct in many ways.
Most importantly for purposes of a theory of precedent is the central role accorded
the common good. Other originalists argue that originalism advances values
including Rule of Law values, 52 popular sovereignty, 5 3 protection of natural
rights, 54 and the "writtenness" of our Constitution.'" Because the values advanced
by these versions of originalism are in conflict or in tension with the values
advanced by stare decisis, originalists have struggled to formulate a coherent theory
of precedent. For example, above I discussed Randy Barnett's argument that the
writtenness of the Constitution requires originalism to reject nonoriginalist
precedent. 561 show in the next section that originalism grounded in the Aristotelian
tradition and its concept of the common good permits-and makes normatively
constitutional interpretation, the interpreter is drawing forth the meaning of the Constitution. Constitutional
construction, by contrast, goes beyond the meaning of the Constitution. Constitutional construction takes up where
interpretation has left off. This occurs when there are two or more possible answers consistent with the original
meaning of the Constitution, even after all the tools of interpretation have been utilized. For this reason,
constitutional constructions are not completely indeterminate. On the contrary, the constructor is constrained by
the meaning of the Constitution uncovered through interpretation, underdetermined though it is. BARNETr, supra
note 11, at 118-30; WHITTINGTON, CONsITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at 5-14.

As explained above, the only warrant possessed by the judiciary to overrule Congress is the Constitution
itself. But if the original meaning of the Constitution has been exhausted and there is no determinate answer to a
question, then Congress's determination of what the common good requires-its constitutional
construction-should prevail over a contrary judgment by the judiciary. This is true for a number of reasons, which
I discuss in Strang, Role of the Common Good,supra note 55.
149. By "justificatory framework" I am referring to Dworkinian structures of the law. See, e.g., DWORKIN,
supranote 65, at 116-17 ("[The judge] must construct a scheme of abstract and concrete principles that provides
a coherent justification for all common law precedents and, so far as these are to be justified on principle,
constitutional and statutory provisions as well.").
150. The virtue ofjustice as lawfulness will enable the judge to respectfully determine whether the judge has
discretion regarding the legal materials, and practical wisdom will enable thejudge to choose that justificatory legal
framework that best advances the common good.
In this paragraph Iam describing the discretion judges retain in constitutional adjudication to order the
pertinent legal materials in different ways. Strang, Role of the Commong Good, supra note 55, at 72-74. I hope
to describe this more fully in future work on the role of originalist precedent.
151. See infra Part Ill.B.4.
152. Kay, supra note 88, at 285-88.
153. WHrrINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at 34-46.

154. BARNETT, supra note 11, at 32-88.
155. Id.at 89-117.
156. See supra notes 129-135 and accompanying text.
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attractive-the incorporation of a theory of precedent into originalist constitutional
interpretation.
Second, my understanding of originalism recognizes the need for judicial virtue
to navigate the underdeterminacies of constitutional adjudication. Unlike other
originalists who shun the notion of discretion.in constitutional interpretation and
hence have no concept of judicial virtue, my understanding of originalism comes
ready-made for the discretion that addressing mistaken nonoriginalist precedents
requires.
B. Courts Should Follow NonoriginalistPrecedent Only When Overruling
NonoriginalistPrecedent Would Gravely Harm the Common Good
1. Where Natural Law and Positive Law Meet in American Constitutional
Adjudication
a. The Nature of the Constitution as an Instrument to Enable Society to
Effectively Pursue the Common Good Requires That Originalism Accommodate
the Values Advanced by Stare Decisis
i. The Constitution, the Office of Federal Judge, and the Common Good
The Constitution is the document that orders much of our national social life. It
grants, divides, and limits the federal government's authority. It is a purposive
instrument, the nature of which is to order society to an effective pursuit of the
common good.'
The Preamble to the Constitution identifies that a more effective pursuit of the
common good was the People's purpose behind ratifying the Constitution. The
People recognized that the Union under the Articles of Confederation was
incomplete and sought to make it "more perfect." The People sought to re-order
society to achievejustice, domestic peace, external defense, and the general welfare
of the members of our society.' This is the essence of common good. The People
recognized that the common good, and thus the individual goods of its members,
was not being achieved under the Articles
and sought to use the Constitution to re159
order society to achieve those ends.
The federal judge has an important role to play in our constitutional system-one
that is essential to ensuring our society's effective pursuit of the common good. The
federal judge's most important role is as protector of the constitutional social
ordering. The Framers and Ratifiers feared the centralizing power of Congress and
believed that in order to keep Congress within its prescribed constitutional bounds,
157. For a discussion of the purposive nature of the Constitution, that is, the Constitution as the means
through which our society ordered itself to the effective pursuit of the common good, see generally Strang, Central
Western PhilosophicalTradition,supra note 135.
158. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
159. The specific clauses and the structure of the Constitution identify the concrete means by which the
People sought to secure the common good. The People authorized the federal government to pursue many of the
goods that constitute the common good but wisely did so in a limited fashion through the enumeration of powers
and with explicit textual limits such as those in the Bill of Rights.

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 36

an institution independent of the political influence of Congress and independent
of the temporary passions of the People must enforce the Constitution. This
institution is the federal judiciary, which was empowered to nullify acts of Congress
that contravened the Constitution. This understanding of the role of the judiciary
and of constitutional judicial review is found in Federalist78"6 and was utilized by
v. Madison to establish the propriety of
Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury
61
constitutional judicial review.'
ii. Precedent Serves Rule of Law Values Central to
Pursuit of the Common Good
Within this context, we can better see the proper role for precedent. Precedent
serves Rule of Law values: values that are central to any plausible account of how
a society may effectively pursue the common good.
The value of the Rule of Law is both intrinsic and instrumental. 162 The Rule of
Law is intrinsically valuable because, "[w]here it is observe[d], people are
confronted by a state which treats them as rational agents due some respect as
such."'163 Human beings grasp and act based on practical reasons and at the same
time exclude acting upon other practical reasons.64 "Laws," in turn, "provide beings
1 65
capable of grasping and acting on reasons with (additional) reasons for action"
because laws enable social cooperation without which members of a society could
not achieve many goods. 166 Therefore, the Rule of Law, which provides members
of a society with conclusive reasons for action,68 67 treats the members respectfully,
as rational beings, and is valuable as a result.
Instrumentally, the Rule of Law provides the necessary environment so that
members of a society can pursue goods constitutive of themselves free from
arbitrary manipulation. 169 John Finnis has listed eight characteristics of the Rule of
Law:
A legal system exemplifies the Rule of Law to the extent.. .that (i) its rules are
prospective, not retroactive, and (ii) are not in any other way impossible to
comply with; that (iii) its rules are promulgated, (iv) clear, and (v) coherent one
with another; that (vi) its rules are sufficiently stable to allow people to be
guided by their knowledge of the content of the rules; that (vii) the making of

160.

THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). In another Article, I discuss the implications of

Hamilton's defense of judicial review and the modem rejection of the defense beginning with Alexander Bickel.
See Strang, Aristotelian Tradition, supra note 48, at 523-24, 574-98.
161. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803).

162. For a provocative discussion on the benefit of court-made law being rule-like, see Antonin Scalia, The
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989).

163. Neil MacCormick, NaturalLaw and the Separation of Law and Morals, in NATURAL LAW THEORY:
CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 105, 123 (Robert P. George ed. 1992).
164.

ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW 116 (1999).

165. Id. at 120.
166. JOHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGrr 155 (1980).
167. GEORGE, supra note 164, at 120.
168. While not essential to the concept of the Rule of Law, in the United States the laws by which we are
governed are created through processes that encourage the participation of those whom the laws will govern. This
process accords participants the respect of being capable of ordering their corporate life.
169. See FINNIS, supra note 166, at 272-73.
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decrees and orders applicable to relatively limited situations is guided by rules
that are promulgated, clear, stable, and relatively general; and that (viii) those
people who have authority to make, administer, and apply the rules in an official
capacity (a) are accountable for their compliance with rules applicable to their
performance and (b) do actually administer the law consistently and in
accordance with its tenor. 70
Stare decisis advances these values.
A doctrine of precedent advances Rule of Law values by giving those governed
by the law reasons for action. In other words, members of society will know that the
proposition decided in Case X will govern their conduct into the future and are
thereby given reasons to prospectively guide their conduct. The legal norms
announced in Case X, in our legal practice, are realistically possible to follow. In
fact, one of the criteria used by the Supreme Court that counsels overruling
precedent is the unworkability of the precedent's rule. 17 1 The publication of
opinions, announcement of opinions in open court, and discussion in the media
effectively alert attorneys, and to a lesser extent the populace, to the content of a
precedent. The Court strives mightily to assimilate a case with past precedent and
with other pertinent areas of law. The result is that precedents are generally clear
and cohere with other decisions.
The doctrine of stare decisis ensures that the rule announced in a precedent will
govern conduct into the future without sudden or drastic changes. A doctrine of
precedent allows members of society to plan their lives, to make decisions that will
have an impact into the future, and to be confident that their plans will not be
harmed because of radical change. The value of stability is so great that people of
all eras have tolerated unjust governments simply for the sake of stability. 172 A
doctrine of precedent serves the value of stability by limiting change in the law.
Change is not eliminated but its pace is slowed. Members of society know that
decisions affecting their lives will do so in a predictable manner. Accordingly, they
will be able to order their private and public lives with faith that their plans will not
be thwarted unexpectedly.
Lastly, one of the values advanced by adherence to precedent is that the
discretion of judges is constrained by precedent. As case law builds up around
authoritative texts, the legal questions that remain open diminish in importance and
number because such questions have been authoritatively settled through
adjudication. This process advances the other interests stare decisis supports (for
example, predictability) as it constrains judges through the law.

170. Id at 270-71; see also LON L FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 39 (rev. ed. 1969) (offering eight
criteria of the Rule of Law similar to Fmnis); Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, 93 LAw Q. REv. 195
(1977) (offering a formulation of the Rule of Law). For an earlier and influential formulation of the components
of the Rule of Law, see A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONsTnTmoN 202-03

(0Oth ed. 1960).
171. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) ("[W]e may ask whether
the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability.").
172. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE,
2 (U.S. 1776) ("Prudence, indeed, will dictate that
Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and, accordingly, all experience
hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by
abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed.").
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The Framers recognized the central role stare decisis plays in protecting Rule of
Law values, which in turn permit the effective pursuit of the common good.' 73
Madison, for example, argued that judges must follow constitutional precedents:
Because it is a reasonable and established axiom, that the good of society
requires that the rules of conduct of its members should be certain and known,
which would not be the case if any judge, disregarding the decision of his
predecessors, should vary the rule of law according to his individual interpretation of it.' 74
These theoretical arguments that stare decisis advances the Rule of Law are
bolstered by empirical research. For example, in a comparative study of the U.S.
and Swiss Supreme Courts, Swiss scholar Thomas Probst 175 found that "an
inadequately developed theory and practice of precedent [by the Swiss Supreme
Court] had led to a loss of predictability and an unacceptably high frequency of
violations of the principle that like cases ought to be treated alike."' 176 The real
world effect of the U.S. Supreme Court's adherence to a doctrine of precedent has
been improved adherence to Rule of Law values compared to other court systems
without as developed a concept of precedent.
In the United States, the harmful impact of the Court's failure to adhere to
constitutional precedent can be seen by looking at its death penalty jurisprudence.
The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution prohibits "cruel and unusual
punishments."' 177 When the Eighth Amendment was ratified in 1791, the death
penalty was regularly used. Further, the text of the Constitution appears to
recognize the constitutionality of the death penalty in the Fifth Amendment by
permitting the deprivation of "life" with due process of law.' 78 Therefore, it came
as no surprise when, in the 1971 case of McGautha v. California, the Supreme
9
Court upheld the constitutionality of the challenged death penalty regimes.
However, the very next year, in Furman v. Georgia, the Court ruled that the
death penalty as practiced in most states was unconstitutional.8 0 Even Justice
Blackmun, who explicitly acknowledged his strong moral opposition to the death
penalty, found that in the Court's sudden change of heart it "overstepped" its role. 8 '
Furman caused enormous disruption in the nation both culturally and legally. The

173. I will discuss the views of those contemporaneous to the Ratification in the next section.
174. Letter from James Madison to Charles Jared Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), in THE MIND OFTHE FOUNDER:
SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 390, 391 (Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981).
175. THOMAS PROBST, DIE ANDERUNG DER RECHTSPRECHUNG: EINE RECHTSVERGLEICHENDE,
METHODOLOGISCHE UNTERSUCHUNG ZUM PHANOMEN DER HOCHSRICHTERLICHEN RECHTSPRECHUNGSANDERUNG
IN DER SCHWEIZ (CIVIL LAW) UND DEN VEREINIGHTEN STAATEN (COMMON LAW) (1993); see also Thomas Probst,

Sources of Law, Legal Reasoning and Stare Decisis: Comparative Methodological Reflections on the Law in the
United States and Switzerland (on file with author) (extensively comparing the role of stare decisis in the United
States and
176.
177.
178.

Switzerland).
Mary Ann Glendon, Comment, in SCALIA, supra note 15, at 95, 102.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Id. amend. V.

179. 402 U.S. 183, 196 (1971).
180. 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972).
181.

Id. at 414 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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immediate legislative result was that at least thirty-five1 states
reenacted death
2
penalty statutes trying to conform to Furman's mandates. 1
A mere four years after Furman, in Gregg v. Georgia, the Supreme Court
reversed course again, this time concluding that the death penalty was not unconstitutional in all applications, and upholding Georgia's revised capital punishment
statute.'83 Since Gregg, the Supreme Court has erratically restricted the death
penalty by both imposing further strictures on use of the death penalty,184 and in
other cases by issuing conflicting rules.' 85 The result of the Supreme Court's death
penalty jurisprudence has been, as Justice Scalia wrote recently in dissent, to
"destroy[] stability and make[] our case law an unreliable basis for the designing of
laws by citizens and their representatives, and for action by public officials."' 86
iii. Nonoriginalist Precedent and Stare Decisis: Originalism Must Accommodate
Stare Decisis for Sake of the Common Good
These examples show that stare decisis advances Rule of Law values and that a
lack of respect for precedent undermines these values. Because Rule of Law values
are inherently and instrumentally worthwhile, stare decisis is essential to effective
pursuit of the common good.
The overruling of all of the accumulated nonoriginalist constitutional precedent
would greatly harm Rule of Law values. For example, Justice Thomas, a strong
advocate of originalism, has urged the Court to repudiate the "substantial effects
test" from its Commerce Clause jurisprudence." 7 However, much of the modem
regulatory state, nearly all anti-discrimination laws, and countless other federal laws
and regulations are based on the expansive reading of Congress's Commerce Clause
power made possible by the substantial effects test.
Take just one aspect, anti-discrimination laws, and consider the disruption caused
by an originalist repudiation of the substantial effects test. People, especially those
who might be subject to invidious discrimination, have ordered their lives in part
on the assumption that they have legal recourse if they are subject to discrimination.
Anti-discrimination laws have substantially aided the upward mobility of those
subject to discrimination. 8 Governmental and other institutions have ordered

182. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-80 (1976).
183. Id. at 187, 206-07.
184. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (ruling that the execution of the mentally retarded
is unconstitutional); see also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (ruling that execution of a criminal who
committed murder at age seventeen did not violate the Eighth Amendment), overruledby Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551 (2005).
185. CompareFurman,408 U.S. at 239-40 (requiring that the sentencer not have unlimited discretion), with
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (requiring that the sentencer be allowed to take all mitigating
circumstances into account).
186. Roper, 543 U.S. at 630 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
187. The most extreme example of the Court's "substantial effects test" is found in Wickard v. Filburn,317
U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that Congress's Commerce Clause authority extended to wheat grown and consumed on
a farm).
188.

See, e.g., THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ScIENcEs, A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN

SOcIETY 297 (1990) ("[T]he decade of the 1960s was a period of great economic advancement for blacks. These
gains were largely due to overall employment growth, increases in blacks' relative education, and reduction in racial
discrimination."); BENJAMIN .PAGE & JAMES R. SIMMONS, WHAT GOVERNMENT CAN Do: DEALING WITH
POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 233 (2000) (noting that many factors, including antidiscrimination laws, led to
"considerably less overt discrimination").
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themselves to comply with and further the federal anti-discrimination mandates. As
a result, the substantial effects test is deeply entrenched in the law. This is not to say
that such an overruling is not required, only that there are costs that must be
acknowledged.
As discussed above, the theory and practice of adhering to precedent supports
Rule of Law values, which are vitally important to societal pursuit of the common
good because the Rule of Law is both intrinsically and instrumentally valuable.189
The purpose of the U.S. Constitution is to enable society to effectively pursue the
common good, and the duty of the judge in constitutional adjudication is to enforce
the prudential social ordering embodied in the Constitution through enforcement of
the original meaning of the text of the Constitution. This ensures effective pursuit
of the common good.
However, there are situations where ajudge enforcing the original meaning could
cause grave harm to the common good. Such harm could occur in overruling
nonoriginalist cases and doctrines that do not greatly deviate from the original
meaning, are deeply embedded in the law; are heavily relied upon by society,
institutions, and individuals, and which possess the characteristic of non-legal
justness. 19° Consequently, there is a strong, legitimate need for constitutional
interpretative methodologies-and especially originalism-to preserve a means for
judges to decline to overrule mistaken precedent when doing so would gravely harm
society's pursuit of the common good. Given, as I have argued, originalism's
grounding in the common good, originalism premised on the Aristotelian tradition
can readily accommodate stare decisis. Indeed, the central role of the common good
in originalism makes accommodation of constitutional stare decisis normatively
attractive. Hence, originalism not only can accommodate stare decisis, it should
accommodate precedent when overruling the precedent would gravely harm the
common good.
This grounding of originalism in the Aristotelian tradition's concept of the
common good distinguishes it from other justifications for originalism, which, as
noted earlier, 9' have difficulty accommodating constitutional stare decisis. Other
originalists whose originalism is not grounded in the common good either,
consistent with their premises, reject all nonoriginalist precedent, 92 or inexplicably
accommodate some but not all nonoriginalist precedent. 93 Either avenue opens
originalism to the criticisms commonly lodged against it: that originalism is either
too disruptive, or incoherent and unprincipled. Below, I tie the argument of this
subsection, that originalism rooted in the common good can and should accommodate nonoriginalist precedent the overruling of which would gravely harm the
common good, to the original meaning of the Constitution by showing that

189.

See supra notes 162-172 and accompanying text.

190. I discuss this characteristic later in this Article. See infra Part Ill.B.2.c. In short, non-legal justness is
the term I use to describe the effect of a precedent that was illegal when issued but that still created what would

have been rightly ordered relationships absent the legal norm.
191.

See supra notes 151-155 and accompanying text.

192. See Barnett, supra note 92 (manuscript at 1, on file with author); Lawson, supra note 2, at 27-28.
193.

See SCALIA, supra note 15, at 138-40.
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originalism does, in fact, require federal judges to give significant respect to
precedent.
b. The Original Meaning of "judicial Power" in Article II Requires Federal
Judges to Give Significant Respect to Constitutional Precedent
In this subsection I will provide a necessarily brief review of the original
understanding of "judicial Power" found in Article 1II. I will begin by reviewing the
English understanding of precedent up to the ratification of the Constitution. Then
I will turn to the colonial, early American, and post-Ratification understanding(s)
of precedent, and show how Article III incorporated the contemporary practice and
understanding of precedent into judicial power.
Although there is disagreement among scholars regarding whether and in what
fashion precedent was incorporated into the judicial power, I believe the evidence
shows that the understanding of precedent evolved over time and that by
1787-1789, the concept ofjudicial power included significant respect for precedent.
The core determinate understanding was that judicial power included significant
respect for precedent and that judges would be bound by precedent such that they
would
have to follow analogous precedent or give significant reasons for not doing
4
19

SO.

i. The Practice and Understanding of Precedent in Great Britain
The American understanding of judicial power has its roots in the English
common law. Both the American and English doctrines have changed over time."
"It is widely recognized that the English doctrine of precedent hardened during the
nineteenth century."' ' Some authors have interpreted the "hardening" of the
doctrine of precedent during the nineteenth century to mean either that there was no
practice of precedent prior to the nineteenth century, 97 or that if such a practice did
exist it was nevertheless a toothless and impotent one 98 (which would have the
same practical effect as no theory at all).
Although the historical evidence does support the notion that the doctrine of
precedent did not "harden" until the nineteenth century, by 1787 the British
understanding and practice of precedent required significant respect for prior
analogous cases. In fact, as two British legal scholars have noted, "The importance
of case-law has been emphasized since the days of the year books, and there are

194. See Price, supranote 2, at 92-93 ("It is reasonable to conclude that informed thinkers in the Founding
period expected a doctrine of precedent to work at least some minimal degree of constraint on the methods all
courts would use to decide controversies.").
195. Cf. SIR CARLETON KEMP ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING 187 (7th ed. 1964) ("Though it is difficult to

determine the precise stages of evolution, a gradual building up of tradition is discernible.").
196. Jim Evans, Change in the DoctrineofPrecedentDuringthe Nineteenth Century, in PRECEDENT IN LAW
35, 35 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987); see also E.M. Wise, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 21 WAYNE L. REV.

1043, 1045-46 (1975) (discussing the strict version of stare decisis that developed in nineteenth century England).
197. See, e.g., Healy, supra note 38, at 55-56 ("[Flor most of its life the common law operated without a
doctrine of stare decisis.").
198. See J.W. TUBBS, THE COMMON LAW MIND 18 (2000).
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signs that the [English doctrine of precedent] was becoming rigid in the eighteenth
century."' 99
I will discuss some of the features of the English common law system out of
which developed the English doctrine of stare decisis. First was "the judges'
practice of reasoning by analogy.",200 As long ago as the thirteenth century, Lord
Bracton articulated the rule that courts should rely on analogy in making their decisions when confronted with new issues: "If, however, any new and unaccustomed
cases shall emerge, and such as have not been usual in the realm, if, indeed any like
cases should have occurred, let them be judged after a similar case, for it is a good
occasion to proceed from like to like."' '
Bracton himself exemplified this principle: his treatise referred to some five
hundred decided cases. 2 2 Bracton did not invent the practice of reasoning by
analogy, however, because it is evident from many of the cases that he cited in his
treatise that "judges were seeking the guidance of precedent as early as the
thirteenth century. '"203 The Year Books, which began during the reign of Edward I
and ended during the reign of Henry VIII, contain many examples of arguments and
decisions guided by precedents. 2'
In the mid-sixteenth century, the practice of according binding status to precedent
began to solidify.20 5 Sir Edward Coke was central to this change.2r 6 Coke produced
the most complete set of law reports to date, and he extensively used precedent in
his conflicts with the Stuarts and to limit the authority of the King and other
courts.

207

Another feature of the English legal system that contributed to the rise of the
doctrine of stare decisis was the increasing availability of reliable law reports.2 8
Before such reports were available, attorneys and judges were reluctant to rely on
precedent for fear of inaccuracy 2' and because of the simple fact that many past

199.

RUPERT CROSS & J.W. HARRIS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAw 24 (4th ed. 1991) (emphasis added).

200. Id. at 25. As Cross and Harris explained, "[tihe rule of stare decisis causes the judges to reason by
analogy because the principle that like cases must be decided alike involves the analogical extension of the decision
in an earlier case." Id. at 26.
201. 1 HENRIci DE BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 9 (Sir Travers Twiss ed., William
S.Hein & Co. 1990) (1878).
202. ALLEN, supra note 195, at 188. This should not be taken to mean that every judge of the thirteenth
century followed the same practice, however. As Allen pointed out, "Bracton went far beyond his contemporaries
in this respect, and cannot be regarded as representative of the judicial method of his day." Id. This point should
not be stretched too far, however, as there is some evidence that Bracton' s contemporaries and successors did compile casebooks, even if they never published them. See id. at 195 (supposing that Bracton's contemporaries compiled case-books because "some of thejudicial dicta have an air of being based on some kind of private jottings").
203. Id. at 189.
204. See id. at 190-203.
205. Healy, supra note 38, at 60-62. For a discussion of the transformation of English use of precedent, see
Harold J. Berman & Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Transformationof English Legal Science: From Hale to Blackstone,
45 EMORY L.J. 437, 444-51 (1996).
206. For a review of the impact of Coke and his followers, see generally Harold J. Berman, The Origins of
HistoricalJurisprudence:Coke, Selden, Hale, 103 YALE L.J. 1651 (1994).
207. Healy, supra note 38, at 62-66.
208. See id. at 72-73.
209. See id. at 63 (noting that one of Sir Edward Coke's contributions to the development of a doctrine of
precedent was the introduction of reasonably accurate case reports).
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cases became lost to history. By the mid-eighteenth century, relatively reliable
reports first became available.2 10
An important characteristic of the English common law that affected the
development of the doctrine of precedent was the "declaratory theory" of precedent:
courts do not make the law, but merely declare and apply the principles of the
common law in concrete cases-thus, the decisions of courts did not say what the
law was, but rather provided "evidence of the law."'21' The declaratory theory was
used by contemporaries to explain the pervasive practice of precedent. 2 ' 2 This was
the tradition articulated by Coke, Hale, and Blackstone.
Lord Coke stated that "the function of a judge" was not to make law, "but to
declare the law, according to the golden mete-wand of the law and not by the
crooked cord of discretion. 2 3 As Chief Justice from 1613 to 1617, Lord Coke
exemplified the philosophy he espoused; he frequently relied on precedent to guide
his decisions.21 4 Lord Coke's writings had an enormous influence on several
generations of jurists and likely inspired John Vaughan, the Chief Justice of the
Court of Common Pleas from 1668 to 1674, to attempt "to develop a systematic
theory of the authority of precedents. 21
Sir Matthew Hale, another influential legal scholar of the seventeenth century,
also drew on the declaratory theory in The History and Analysis of the Common
Law of England:
[T]he Decisions of Courts of Justice, tho' by Vertue of the Law.. .do not make
a Law properly so called, (for that only the King and Parliament can do); yet
they have a great Weight and Authority in Expounding, Declaring, and
Publishing what the Law of this Kingdom is, especially when such Decisions
hold a Consonancy and Congruity with Resolutions and Decisions of former
Times; and tho' such Decisions are less than a Law, yet they are a greater

Evidence thereof, than the Opinion of any private Persons, as such,
whatsoever.2t 6

In Hale's view, individual judges were constrained by prior decisions: they were not
empowered to ignore decisions they found disagreeable.

210. ld. at 69.
211. See CROSS& HARRIS, supranote 199, at 25 ("According to this theory, the decisions of the judges never
make law, they merely constitute evidence of what the law is."); see also id. at 27-34 (providing an overview of
the declaratory theory).
212. See Healy, supra note 38, at 68 ("The declaratory theory was a tidy compromise between the dictates
of natural law and the growing pressure to follow precedent.").
213. 1 EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OFTHE INSTITUTES OFTHE LAWS OF ENGLAND 51 (London, E&R
Brooke 1797) (1642).
214. Healy, supra note 38, at 63.
But, while [Lord Coke] had great faith in precedent, he believed in it only if it was used
intelligently. He was profoundly dissatisfied with the indiscriminate and pretentious citation,
which seems to have come into vogue in his day, which has not ceased since his death, and of
which, it must be confessed, he was himself not always innocent.
ALLEN, supra note 195, at 207.
215. ALLEN, supra note 195, at 209.
216. SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 68 (Legal
Classics Library 1987) (1713).
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And, of course, no discussion of the declaratory theory of precedent would be
complete without reference to Sir William Blackstone's seminal Commentaries,
published in four volumes between 1765 and 1769 and likely the most influential
legal authority in eighteenth century America.2 1 7 Blackstone wrote that recorded
"judicial decisions are the principal and most authoritative evidence, that can be
'
given, of the existence of such a custom as shall form a part of the common law."218
Blackstone went on to state:
[I]t is an established rule to abide by former precedents, where the same points
come again in litigation: as well to keep the scale of justice even and steady, and
not liable to waver with every new judge's opinion; as also because the law in
that case being solemnly declared and determined, what before was uncertain,
and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent rule, which it is not in the
breast of any subsequent judge to alter or vary from, according to his private
sentiments: he being sworn to determine, not according to his private judgment,
but according to the known laws and customs of the land; not delegated to
pronounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one. Yet this rule
admits of exception, where the former determination is most evidently contrary
to reason; much more if it be contrary to the divine law. But even in such cases
the subsequent judges do not pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate the old
one from misrepresentation. For if it be found that the former decision is
manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was bad law,
but that it was not law; that is, that it is not the established custom of the realm
as has been erroneously determined.... [W]hat is not reason is not law....The
doctrine of the law then is this: that precedents and rules must be followed,
unless flatly absurd or unjust: for though their reason be not obvious at first
view, yet we owe such a deference to former times as not to suppose they acted
wholly without consideration .... 2.9

Blackstone's noted exception to the "established" rule of following prior
analogous decisions ("where the former determination [was] most evidently contrary
to reason")220 helps clarify that stare decisis in 1760's England was not an iron-clad
" ' In the words of Professor
rule, but one that was more flexible.22
Lee, "Blackstone's
venerable statements on the law of precedent...seem to chart a compromise course

217. Two editions of the four-volume Commentaries were initially prepared-an English version first
published in 1764 and an American edition, which appeared in 1772. One thousand copies of the English version
were sold in the American colonies before the publication of the American edition, of which an additional 1,400
sets were sold. Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1996). Blackstone's
Commentaries proved so popular in the colonies that Edmund Burke remarked in Parliament that "they have sold
nearly as many of Blackstone's Commentaries in America as in England." Edmund Burke, Speech on Moving His
Resolutions for Conciliation with the Colonies (Mar. 22, 1775), in PRE-REVOLUTIONARY WRrrINGs 206, 225 (Ian
Harris ed., 1993).
218. WuLLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIEs *69.
219. Id. at *69-70.
220. Id. at *69 (emphasis added).
221. Some have argued that Blackstone was not advocating a rule of precedent at all because the exception
to the rule swallowed the rule itself. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 217, at 37 ("[Blackstone] presented the
'declaratory theory' with a wink and a nod. Blackstone's language appeared to treat the 'declaratory theory' as a
fiction designed to indicate continuity with the past even when innovation had plainly occurred.").
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between the classic adoption of the declaratory theory and a strict notion of stare
decisis. '222
Some commentators have interpreted the predominance of the declaratory theory
to mean that judges were not bound by prior decisions. 223 However, from the
evidence discussed above, it is clear that the common law understanding was that
precedent was binding, and that "common law judges were perceived to have a duty
to articulate some justification for setting aside the evidence of the law found in
4
As Lord Coke stated, "[Olur booke cases are the best proofes
prior decisions. ' 22
225
is."
law
what the
The strong bindingness of precedent-including for advocates of the declaratory
theory-was prominently displayed in Perrinv. Blake, where Blackstone reversed
Chief Judge Mansfield's refusal to follow the Rule in Shelley's Case established by
Coke.226 In his opinion for the Exchequer Chamber, Blackstone wrote:
There is hardly an ancient rule of real property but what has in it more or less of
a feudal tincture.... [B]ut whatever their parentage was, they are now adopted by
the common law of England, incorporated into its body, and so interwoven with
its policy, that no court ofjustice in this kingdom has either the poweror (I trust)
the inclinationto disturb them....22'

Stare decisis was applied more vigorously in cases involving property or
contract. The predominant view was that for property and contractual228reliance
issues, it was better that the law "be settled than that it be settled right."
222. Lee, supra note 2, at 662.
223. In particular, Professor Lee argues:
This declaratory notion of common law decisions presupposes a relatively weak (if not nonexistent) doctrine of stare decisis. Far from demanding adherence to case law, the classic
declaratory theory left ample room for departing from precedent under the fiction that prior
decisions were not law in and of themselves but were merely evidence of it.
Id. at 660; see also Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1577 ("The picture that emerges is one in which precedent is treated
as evidence of the content of the law, but not as law itself.").
224. Lee, supra note 2, at 661.
225. 2 Sm EDWARD COKE, COKE UPON ITnlETONbk. 3, ch. 7, § 420 (Philadelphia, Robert H. Small 1853).
226. See DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCEOFLEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGALTHEORY INEIGHTEENTHCENTURY BRITAIN 135-42 (1989). The Rule in Shelly's Case requires that when a life estate is given to a person
and the remainder is given to the same person's heirs, then the holder of the life estate takes the remainder as well.
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP & SHELDON KURT, PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW 219 (6th ed. 2005).
227. LIEBERMAN, supra note 226, at 139-40.
228. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Healy,
supranote 38, at 69 ("Though ajudge could still declare in 1760 that 'erroneous points of practice.. .may be altered
at pleasure when found to be absurd or inconvenient,' most judges agreed that precedent should be followed in
cases involving property or contracts, where certainty was essential.") (footnote omitted); see also, e.g., Lee, supra
note 2, at 688 ("Blackstone's explication of error correction drew no express distinction between commercial cases
and other decisions, but the distinction had already taken hold in the English courts.").
Another important limitation on judges' ability to circumvent precedent that is rarely considered by
contemporary commentators is the fact that the English courts of equity never relied on the declaratory theory. The
reason was because, as stated above, the declaratory theory was part of the common law, which was thought of as
a holistic body of law completely separate from the courts of equity. The courts of equity, on the other hand,
developed out of the chancery system. Lawrence Friedman describes the courts of equity as "the most astounding"
of "the formal rivals of the common law." FRIEDMAN, supra note 72, at xvii. Friedman describes the development
of the courts of equity as almost a system of "antilaw"; courts of equity were not bound by strict common-law rules:
"Looser principles governed, principles in accord with prevailing ideas of 'equity."' Id. at xviii. Because the courts
of equity were not bound by the principles of the common law, the doctrine of precedent became more important
for courts of equity than courts of law. Without a solid system of precedent, nothing would prevent a court of equity
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One frequently cited case that illustrates this principle is Morecock v. Dickins,
argued before the High Court of Chancery in 1768.229 In issuing his opinion, Lord
Camden stated that although he was inclined to agree with the logic of the
plaintiff' s claim, he was bound by precedent to rule against him:
If this was a new point, it might admit of difficulty; but the determination in
Bedford v. Bacchus seems to have settled it, and it would be mischievous to
disturb it....It is a point in which a great deal of property is concerned, and is a
matter of consequence. Much property has been settled, and conveyances have
proceeded upon the ground of that determination ....
A thousand neglects to
search [i.e., to search the registries] have been occasioned by that determination,
and therefore I cannot take upon me to alter it. If it was a new case, I should have
my doubts; but the point is closed by that determination, which has been
acquiesced in ever since. 230
In sum, as the foregoing analysis demonstrates, there was in England by 1787 a
coherent theory and practice of precedent. The eighteenth-century system of
precedent practiced by British courts was largely based on the declaratory theory.
Although the British practice and understanding of precedent may have been more
flexible than the hardened nineteenth-century view of precedent that would later
emerge, judges were bound in real and meaningful ways-they were not free to
simply ignore prior decisions.
ii. The Practice and Understanding of Precedent in the United States
Americans had an understanding and practice of precedent, which developed
over time from the colonial era to the Ratification of the Constitution. By the time
of the Ratification, the Framers and Ratifiers understood judicial power to include
stare decisis: judges must give significant respect to prior analogous cases and must
give significant reasons for overruling precedents.
(a) Precedent in Colonial America
In order to understand how the doctrine of precedent developed in the United
States, it is necessary first to explore some of the factors that influenced the
American legal system in its formation. When the colonists came to the New World,
they brought with them and created legal norms rooted in the British common

from deciding a case one way and then ruling in a completely opposite manner the next time it was confronted with
that same issue.
It should come as no surprise, then, that the courts of equity did, in fact, place a strong emphasis on
precedent. As one historian noted, "it may be said of the modern practice of Equity that it has depended even more
than the Common Law on uniformity of decision." ALLEN, supra note 195, at 382. "[T]here [was] an uninterrupted
chain in the influence of precedent, from the earliest times" in the courts of equity, because its principles were
"entirely constructed upon precedent." Id. at 380 (internal quotation marks omitted). As early as 1670, the courts
of equity recognized that they had a firmly entrenched system of precedent. See Fry v. Porter, 1 Mod. 300 (1670).
Finally, despite the view some modern legal scholars have taken that the systems of equity and the common law
were wholly independent, see, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supranote 72, at xviii-xix, it is worth pointing out that courts of
equity frequently called upon common law judges to assist in deciding cases. ALLEN, supra note 195, at 381.
229. 27 Eng. Rep. 440 (Ch.) (1768).
230. Id. at 441 (citation omitted).
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law.23 ' Of course, as some scholars have pointed out, labeling the colonial laws a
legal "system" or "systems" is something of a misnomer. 12 As one historian has
written:
At least a century separates the beginnings of Massachusetts from the beginnings
of Georgia. During this time, English law did not stand still. The colonies began
their careers at different points in the process of legal development. During all
this time... [t]he colonies borrowed as much English law as they wanted to take
or were forced to take. Their appetite was determined by requirements of the
moment, by ignorance or knowledge of what was happening abroad, and by
general obstinacy. 233
In the seventeenth century, the colonists had only just begun the process of
taming the New World, and so it is not surprising that their legal system was
exceedingly simple. Aside from the normal difficulties associated with constructing
a new society, there were several obstacles that the colonists had to overcome to
establish a practice of precedent. I will briefly address three of these obstacles: (1)
the animosity that many colonists felt for lawyers, (2) the lack of adequate legal
training in the early colonies, and (3) the scarcity and poor quality of early court
reports.
The first obstacle, the ill will directed at lawyers by the colonists, was fairly
widespread.2 34 In many locations lawyers were forbidden to practice their craft, and
there was often a great deal of ill-will directed at anyone who professed training in
or knowledge of the law. 235 For example, in 1669 the drafters of the Fundamental
Constitutions of the Carolinas stated that "it was considered 'a base and vile thing
to plead for money or reward.' 2 36 Lawyers were similarly disliked in Virginia
where they were excluded from the courts beginning in 1645, and Connecticut,
where they were prohibited from practicing.23 7
The colonists' enmity lacked longevity, however, and there was a dramatic
reversal of public opinion in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The
colonists began to accept lawyers as a "necessary evil," and "as soon as a settled
society posed problems for which lawyers had an answer or at least a skill, the
lawyers appeared in force, and flourished despite animosity. ' 238 By the mid-

231. FRIEDMAN, supra note 72, at 4-5, 15. After the Revolutionary War, many colonies officially adopted
the common law by statute. See MORTONJ. HORwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1780-1860, at
4 (1977) ("Between 1776 and 1784, eleven of the thirteen original states adopted, directly or indirectly, some
provisions for the reception of the common law as well as of limited classes of British statutes.").
232. See, e.g., Stanley N. Katz, Explaining the Law in EarlyAmerican History, 50 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 6
(1993); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 72, at xiii ("[Tjhere was no 'colonial law' any more than there is an
'American law,' common to all fifty states. There were as many colonial systems as there were colonies.").
233. FRIEDMAN, supra note 72, at xiii.
234. See DANIELJ. BooRsTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 197 (1958) ("[There was no

developed legal profession in any of the colonies before the mid-eighteenth century. The ancient English prejudice
against lawyers secured new strength in America.").
235. FRIEDMAN, supra note 72, at 53-59.
236. Id. at 53.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 83-84.
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eighteenth century lawyers had gained respect and prestige, and many held public
office.239
The second obstacle that the colonists had to overcome was the lack of goodquality, consistent legal training in the country. There were no American law
schools in the seventeenth century; the first formal law school in America was not
established until nearly the end of the eighteenth century, when the Litchfield Law
School was founded in Connecticut in 1782.2" To fill the vacuum, some lawyers
" '
came over from England to practice in the colonies.24
Many colonists also began to take up the practice of law through self-instruction
or apprenticeship. 24 2 With a few notable exceptions, the quality of self-education
was poor, due in large part to the dearth of law books and because standards for
admission to the bar were minimal.243
In the eighteenth century, an increasing number of would-be lawyers were able
to secure apprenticeships, where, in theory at least, they would learn the law from
an established practitioner. Usually the aspiring lawyer paid a fee of one hundred
to two hundred pounds, a substantial sum for that era, and then spent several years
serving as an assistant to the veteran lawyer.2' The clerkship system, however, was
"plagued with numerous problems."" Such prominent lawyers as Thomas Jefferson
and William Livingston complained about clerkships because the clerk received
very little real legal training of worth and spent most of his time merely copying
246

forms.

One other option that was available to a few fortunate men was to study at the
prestigious Inns of Court in England. The cost of attending the Inns was
considerable, however, so only the wealthiest colonists could afford to do So. 24 7

239. Id. at 84-85.
240. CRAIG EVAN KLAFrER, REASON OVER PRECEDENTS: ORIGINS OF AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 133

(1993).
241. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 72, at 55 (noting that "[m]en trained in law in England, who came over,
found their services in demand").
242. See, Richard J. Ross, The Legal Past ofEarly New England: Notesfor the Study of Law, Legal Culture,
andIntellectual History, 50 WM. & MARY Q. 28, 40 (1993) ("Most early American lawyers and judges had little
or no professional training; some labored at more than one calling, combining law with medicine, trade, ministry,
or government."). The tradition of self-education proved an enduring one. As late as 1855, Abraham Lincoln
advised an aspiring lawyer who wished to study with him that it was unnecessary:
If you are resolutely determined to make a lawyer of yourself, the thing is more than half done
already. It is but a small matter whether you read with any body or not. I did not read with any
one. Get the books, and read and study them till, you understand them in their principal features;
and that is the main thing.
Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Isham Reavis (Nov. 5, 1855), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND
WRTINGS 337, 337 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1946).
243. KLAFTER, supra note 240, at 8. Patrick Henry, for example, studied Coke and the Virginia Statutes for
about six weeks before seeking permission to practice law. "The majority of his examiners concluded that he knew
little of the law, but they nevertheless approved him because they thought he would learn quickly." Id. Henry's
experience was typical of new lawyers during the colonial era. "Ihe obvious problems with this method of
education led to a period after the Revolution when all of the states except Virginia passed laws requiring at least
some specified period of clerkship before admittance to practice, thus precluding self-education as a sole means
of legal training." Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. The high costs of attending one of the Inns of Court undoubtedly deterred Americans who,
since they hailed from one of the colonies, definitely were under a social handicap and, hence,
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"Perhaps as many as sixty American-born lawyers were educated at the Inns of
Court prior to the year 1760, and more than 115 between 1760 and the American
Revolution. Of the 236 or so American-born members of the Inns of Court before
1815, nearly half were admitted between 1750 and 1775."' Lawyers trained at the
Inns often became mentors to the next generation of lawyers and had a significant
impact on the quality and standards of the colonial legal profession.249
Similar to England, the third obstacle the colonists faced in establishing their
legal system was the lack of case reports. As one historian bluntly stated, "There
were no American reports to speak of in the colonial period."25 Colonial lawyers
had to rely chiefly on English casebooks or on what they could decipher about the
cases included in English legal treatises.25 ' A few lawyers made their own reports.
Some used only cases to which they were a party; some collected cases tried by the
local courts, on their own or with the assistance of sitting judges; most had to rely
on their memory, but a few had access to notes written by the lawyers or judges
involved in the case. For the most part these lawyers did not publish the reports they
made; they seem to have made them simply for their own use.252
Some were published, however, such as Ephraim Kirby's ConnecticutReports,
which began in 17 89, and Alexander Dallas's Reports of CasesRuled andAdjudged
in the Courts of Pennsylvania, Before and Since the Revolution, which was
published in 1790 and contained cases going back as far as 1754.253 These reports
proved to be quite popular: "lawyers were eager for a supply of reported cases; and
were willing to pay for such reports. ' '254 Notwithstanding the efforts of these
enterprising lawyers, the few private reports that were available were inadequate for
the needs of the burgeoning colonial legal system.

had to maintain appearances at great expense to themselves. Philip Livingston, for instance,
found it impossible to live in London on less than £450 per year.
I ANTON-HERMANN CHROuST, THE RISE OFTHE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 33

n.88 (1965).
248. Id. at 33.
249. Id. at 36 & n.98. The quality of education available at the Inns of Court steadily declined, however, and
by the mid-eighteenth century "the Inns had deteriorated into clubhouses for the profession, which no longer offered
formalized legal education." KLAFTER, supra note 240, at 8 (citation omitted). The Inns were in such a sad state
that Blackstone lamented in his Commentaries that there was probably nothing that was "more hazardous or
discouraging" for a would-be lawyer than attending them. BLACKSTONE, supra note 218, at *31. Blackstone felt
that the Inns "entirely neglected" any form of academic oversight "either with regard to morals or studies," id. at
*25, and offered instead only "allurements to pleasure" and addictive "amusements [and] other less innocent
pursuits." Id. at *31. Regarding the Inns, William S. Holdsworth commented that "[f]rom the latter half of the
seventeenth century to the middle of the nineteenth century the student was left to his own resources." W.S.
Holdsworth, The Disappearanceof the EducationalSystem of the Inns of Court, 69 U. PA. L. REv. 201, 216
(1921).
250. FRIEDMAN, supra note 72, at 241. Frederick Kempin put it this way:
The position of the reports in the American colonies was the same as, or worse than, the position
of the English reports. While England had some reliable, although unofficial, reports during the
17th and 18th centuries, it is safe to say that the colonists had none until the nineteenth century.
Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Precedentand Stare Decisis:The CriticalYears, 1800 to 1850, in 3 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
28, 34 (1959) (footnote omitted).
251. FRIEDMAN, supra note 72, at 241-42.
252. Kempin, supra note 250, at 34-35; see also, FRmDMAN, supra note 72, at 241-45.
253. FRIEDMAN, supra note 72, at 242.
254. Id.
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Given these conditions, it is not surprising that the doctrine of precedent was
slow to develop in the colonial legal system. Nevertheless, such a system did
develop. The doctrine of stare decisis was at its weakest in the seventeenth century
when the colonists were still focused on eking out an existence in their new land
and did not have the time or resources necessary for a system of precedent to
function. During the seventeenth century colonial law seemed to favor flexibility
and innovation over certainty.255 As colonial society grew more populous and more
sophisticated, the services of skilled lawyers became more in demand. Lawyers
came in ever greater numbers from England and brought a strong respect for
precedent with them, which was inculcated in subsequent generations of lawyers.
In the early to mid-eighteenth century, lawyers and judges began to develop and
apply a system of precedent.25 6
The declaratory theory became even more popular after the publication of
Blackstone's Commentaries. It is difficult to overstate the importance of
Blackstone' s writings on the developing colonial legal system.257 As one scholar has
observed, "In Blackstone, early American lawyers encountered a legal authority
who regarded precedent as the cornerstone of the common law, the principal
bulwark against the usurpation of the rule of law by judicial tyranny. "258
While during the seventeenth century colonial courts seemed to favor flexibility
and innovation over certainty, in the eighteenth century these values were reversed.
"Americans of the prerevolutionary period expected their judges to be automatons
who mechanically applied immutable rules of law to the facts of each case. 259
Indeed, "lawyers had for a half century watched inactive legislatures and judges
who adhered to precedent with a simple-minded rigor and consistency. The mere
26
citation of precedent, in short, seemed to solve virtually every legal problem.", 0
John Adams exemplified the growing respect for precedent. He regarded
precedent as an absolute necessity to prevent the courts from encroaching upon the
rights of the citizens.261 Adams wrote that "the Laws of every State ought always
to be fixed, [and] certain, 2 62 and that "every possible Case [should be] settled in a

255. Id. at22 ("[The] long-run trend was the same [throughout the colonies]: from simplicity and innovation
to more complexity, and ever greater doses of English formality, somewhat second-hand.").
256. LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 50 (1st ed. 1973) ("The doctrine of precedent
was in high fashion among lawyers and judges. English law was held up as a model.").
257. See William D. Bader, Some Thoughts on Blackstone, Precedent,and Originalism, 19 VT. L. REV. 5

(1994). As Bader observed, historians such as Daniel Boorstin, James McLellan, Bernard Bailyn, and R. Kent
Newmyer have "all specifically noted that Sir William Blackstone was the common law scholar with the most
profound influence on shaping the legal thought of the Revolutionary and Founding generations." Id. at 6 (footnote
omitted).
258.

Id. at 8. The declaratory theory was less favored in those colonies that had rejected the common law or

extensively modified it. In Massachusetts, for example, the doctrine of precedent was much more binding. One
historian has noted that the colonists of Massachusetts embraced the doctrine of precedent as a method "[t]o bind
judges to the rule of law and thereby render the lives, liberties, and properties of individuals secure." WILLIAM E.
NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OFTHECOMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OFLEGALCHANGE ON MASSACHUSETrS SOCIETY,

1760-1830, at 18 (1975).
259. NELSON, supra note 258, at 19.
260. Id.
261. Adams' views were no doubt influenced by the years he spent practicing law in Massachusetts which
from an early time had a system of precedent that was much stricter than the other colonies. See supra note 258.
262. NELSON, supra note 258, at 19.
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Precedent, leav[ing] 263
nothing, or but little to the arbitrary Will or uninformed Reason
of Prince or Judge.,

As in England, stare decisis was especially strong in cases involving property or
commercial reliance interests. In Somerville v. Johnson,26 for example, a Maryland
judge wrote an opinion reminiscent of the language found in the early English case
of Morecock v. Dickins.265 The court in Somerville was confronted with a question
involving the interpretation of a will in which William Deacon granted a life estate
in land and four slaves to Mary Johnson. The main issue was whether children born
to one of the slaves after Deacon's death were also part of the life estate. 2 6 The
judge believed that the better argument was that the children should be part of the
life estate,267 but ruled against Johnson because of precedent:
I apprehend the present rule must be stare decisis, a rule founded on great
convenience .... [As] Lord Talbot observed, that the rules of property being
certain and known, it is not of great consequence what they are. The instances
in which Judges have been governed by this consideration, are infinite....
[E]ver since the case of Scott v. Dobson, the law has been in this point looked
upon to be settled. The general opinions of lawyers have been accordingly;
purchases have been made, and much property is held under it, and if a solemn
decision in the dernier provincial resort should not be conclusive, contentious
suits would be infinite.2 s
The language used by the court was very similar to that of the English Morecock
case: both judges were expressing similar concepts based on a long-standing
tradition of increased deference to precedents involving property and commercial
reliance issues. 269
From the foregoing analysis, it is clear that there was a discernible doctrine and
practice of precedent in the American colonial legal system. During the seventeenth
century such a doctrine was weak, but in the eighteenth century, as the colonial
legal system became increasingly complex, the doctrine of precedent came to
resemble its English counterpart. Stare decisis was particularly strong in cases
involving property or commercial reliance issues.
(b) Precedent in State Courts After the Revolution
Several scholars and commentators have argued that the doctrine of precedent
was firmly established in the late eighteenth century. For example, in his opinion
in Anastasoffv. United States, Judge Arnold wrote:

263. 1 DIARYANDAuTOBIOGRAPHYOFJOHNADAMS 167 (L.H. Butterfielded., 1961). Ithas also been noted
that when Adams served as defense counsel for the British soldiers responsible for the Boston Massacre, Adams'
defense relied heavily on precedent, and all but one of the cases he relied on were British cases. NELSON, supranote
258, at 19-20.
264. 1 H. & McH. 348 (Md. Ch. 1770).
265. 27 Eng. Rep. 440 (1768); see supra notes 229-230 and accompanying text.
266. Somerville, 1 H. & McH. at 348-49.

267. See id. at 353 ("[Ifthis was a new case, I should be strongly inclined to advise a different order from
that which I think myself bound to.....
268. Id. at 353-54.
269. The practice and understanding of precedent continued to afford increased deference to precedent
involving property or commercial reliance interests in the nineteenth century. See Price, supra note 2, at 95-99.
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The doctrine of precedent was well-established by the time the Framers gathered
in Philadelphia. To the jurists of the late eighteenth century (and thus by and
large to the Framers), the doctrine seemed not just well established but an
immemorial custom,
the way judging had always been carried out, part of the
70
course of the law.1
Judge Arnold determined that "the doctrine of precedent was not merely well
established; it was the historic method of judicial decision-making, and 271well
regarded as a bulwark of judicial independence in past struggles for liberty.,
By contrast, Thomas Healy has argued that the doctrine of precedent was far
from settled in the late eighteenth century. According to Healy,
in the decades following the war the courts embarked on one of the most creative
periods in American judicial history, shaping the law to meet the needs of the
new nation and abandoning large numbers of precedents, both English and
domestic. Judges during this period adopted an instrumental view of the law.272
In a similar vein, Morton Horwitz has written that the colonial legal system in the
eighteenth century applied "a strict conception of precedent ....
[T]he overwhelming
fact about American law through most of the eighteenth century is the extent to
which lawyers believed that English authority settled virtually all questions for
which there was no legislative rule. ' 273 After the Declaration of Independence,
however, "one of the most universal features of postrevolutionary American
jurisprudence was an attack on the colonial subservience to precedent. 274
I believe that this scholarly divergence can be reconciled. While true, the
instrumentalists' model as argued by Thomas Healy is incomplete because it
oversimplifies the behavior of post-Revolutionary American courts. Although there
is evidence indicating that, after the Declaration of Independence, American courts
did increasingly reject precedents, they did not do so haphazardly. Rather, American
courts developed a set of principles that governed when courts would disregard
precedents.
These principles developed out of the growing reluctance of American courts to
be bound by English precedents. This was, in part, a natural result of the
Revolution. 275 Indeed, even Healy--despite his instrumentalist view-recognized
that courts "frequently departed from long-standing English precedents" and that
the "most frequent justification" for overruling precedent "was that common law
rules were inapplicable to American circumstances. 276 Moreover, it is telling that

270. 223 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir. 2000) (citations and footnote omitted).
271. Id.
272. Healy, supra note 38, at 78.
273. HoRwrrz, supra note 231, at 8.
274. Id. at 24. Horwitz argued that the cause of the shift in stare decisis from a strict to a lax conception was
the shift in conceptions of the nature of the common law from natural law to positive law. Id. at 14-30.
275. See KLAFrER, supra note 240, at 67 ("[D]uring America's post-Revolutionary and early National
periods, a distinctly American legal methodology was employed by American lawyers and judges to question the
soundness of English precedents.").
276. Healy, supranote 38, at 79-80 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Professor Caleb Nelson has argued
that the declaratory theory of precedent held by common law lawyers permitted American courts to reject English
precedent. NELSON, supra note 258, at 28-3 1. I believe this analysis is correct so far as it goes, but that it fails to
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in Healy's long discussion of overruled cases, he listed only two cases that
overruled domestic precedents, both of which were post-i 800.277
Connecticut was possibly the first state to begin to reject English precedents. In
1786, the Superior Court of Connecticut decided Wilford v. Grant,where the court
was confronted with the problem of whether to grant a new trial for two minors who
had been sued for and found guilty of assault and battery along with four other
men.278 The minors had been absent from the trial because, as minors, they were
legally incapable of arranging their own defense. The jury found for the plaintiff
against all the defendants in the amount of seventy-five pounds. Requesting a new
trial, the minor defendants appealed, but common law precedents did not permit a
new trial to be granted for some co-defendants and not for others.279 The court
granted the new trial for the minors, and in so doing, articulated a modified version
of stare decisis that afforded less weight to English precedent:
The common law of England we are to pay great deference to, as being a general
system of improved reason, and a source from whence our principles of
jurisprudence have been mostly drawn: The rules, however, which have not been
made our own by adoption, we are to examine, and so far vary from them as they
may appear contrary to reason or unadapted to our local circumstances, the
policy of our law, or simplicity of our practice; which, for the reasons above
suggested, we do in this case, and reverse the judgment as to the minors only.2s
Thus, the court adopted a modified doctrine of stare decisis "by which English
precedents which had not yet been adopted by Connecticut courts could be
disregarded under certain circumstances on a case-by-case basis."28 ' In doing so, the
court provided another reason why English precedent should receive less respect:
English common law precedent accorded with English custom which, although
usually the same as Connecticut's, was not always the same. Hence, when the
customs of the two differed, Connecticut was justified in rejecting the English
282
precedent.
The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors later expanded on this modified
doctrine of stare decisis in the case of Bush v. Bradley.283 In Bush, Justice Reeve,
the founder of the Litchfield Law School,284 departed from a British precedent
because "our system of law respecting real property is, in many instances, very

account for the disparity between the relatively frequent reversals of English rather than American precedent
discussed in his text.
277. Healy, supra note 38, at 81-82.
278. 1 Kirby 114 (Conn. 1786).
279. Id. at 114-16.
280. Id. at 116-17.
281. KLAFrER, supra note 240, at 69.
282. As Richard Murphy stated:
Distinguishing the force of English precedents makes considerable sense if one starts.. .with the
premises that the common law is rooted in custom and practice and that these vary between
Connecticut and England; on this view, one would not necessarily expect English courts to give
authoritative statements concerning Connecticut custom and law, especially after a revolution.
Murphy, supra note 34, at 1092.
283. 4 Day 298 (Conn. 1810).
284. For a discussion of Litchfield, see generally MARIAN C. McKENNA, TAPPING REEVE AND THE
LrrcHFLD LAW SCHOOL (1986).
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different from the English system."285 Justice Reeve thus "redacted into Connecticut
legal practice the idea that the modified doctrine of stare decisis should be applied
to the entire law of real property because a strict adherence to precedents would
of local customs and laws that were different from
have prohibited consideration
286
those in England.

Not all states were so quick to embrace a modified doctrine of stare decisis.
287
Virginia, for example, demonstrated reluctance in abrogating English precedents.
Part of this reluctance probably stemmed from the fact that the Virginians'
288
"preferred method of modifying the common law was to redact it into codes.
Even in Virginia, however, some judges felt that English precedents were no longer
binding after the Revolution. In the case of Commonwealth v. Posey, for example,
Judge Tazewell argued that
[p]recedents, like many other things, may be carried too far; and, although
adjudications upon statutes are often to be considered, as valuable expositions
of the grounds and extent of the enactments, yet, in a case of life and death, I

cannot be bound by the dictum of a British judge, upon a written law; for,
28 9
although I venerate precedents, I venerate the written law more.

Judge Tazewell was in the minority, however, and the court declined the
opportunity to reject the English precedents on point. 290
Virginia courts were less reticent about rejecting English precedents where those
precedents were "deemed to be in conflict."'2 9' When precedents were in conflict,
Virginia courts would often discount them altogether and base their judgments on
other considerations. For example, in the case of Newton v. Wilson, St. George
Tucker issued an opinion for the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, stating that
"[w]here authorities are uncertain and contradictory, we must have recourse to
principle as our guide. 292
Some states went farther even than Connecticut in modifying the doctrine of stare
decisis. New York, for example, demonstrated a particular zeal for casting off
English precedents.2 93 In 1799, the New York Supreme Court of Judicature ignored
an English precedent because "a strict adherence to English common law principles
could on occasion be incompatible with New York's notions of justice and
rationality. 294 The following year, the New York Supreme Court of Judicature took

285.

Bush, 4 Day at 305.

286. KLAFrER, supra note 240, at 70.
287. See, e.g., Boswell v. Jones, I Va. (1 Wash.) 322 (1794).
288.

KLAFrER, supra note 240, at 71.

289. 8 Va. (4 Call) 109, 116 (1787).
290. Four judges made statements indicating that they would follow precedent. In particular, Judge Blair said
that "if it were a new case," he would have found for the defendant, but because the precedents had "prevailed [sic]
so long," they "must be submitted to." Id. at 122 (opinion of Blair, J.).
291.

KLAFrER, supra note 240, at 73.

292. 13 Va. (3 Hen. & M.) 470,480(1809).
293. KLAFrER, supra note 240, at 74 ("New York, perhaps because it perceived itself to have suffered a rich
history of abuses pursuant to English common law authority, adopted and exceeded the same types of modifications
incorporated into Connecticut and Virginia law.").
294. Id. at 75 (discussing Silva v. Low, 1 Johns. Cas. 184 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1799)). In Silva, Judge Radcliffe
stated: "Ientertain a high respect for the decisions of the English courts, but I do not feel myself, in this instance,
shackled by their authority." Silva, 1 Johns. Cas. at 190.
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this even further; in a minority opinion, the Chief Justice declared that he "no
longer considered English cases binding authority in New York courts." 29 5 By 1802,
the New York High Court of Errors followed the Chief Justice, declaring that
English precedents no longer bound New York courts.296
One of the reasons the modified doctrine of stare decisis gained traction in the
post-Revolutionary era was because of the support of legal educators. As mentioned
above,297 Justice Reeve established the first law school in America in 1782.298 Other
schools soon followed299 and by 1810 there were nearly a dozen."tu Most of these
schools included some form of the doctrine of stare decisis in their curriculum.3 '
Many of the prominent legal scholars of the late eighteenth century, including
Justice Reeve and St. George Tucker, who held the chair of law at William and
Mary College,3°2 served both as educators and as distinguished judges. They had a
"double-impact" on the shape of the law. As scholars, both Justice Reeve and St.
George Tucker wrote treatises arguing that American courts should be able to
disregard English precedents in certain circumstances. 0 3 As judges, both men led
the way in putting their own jurisprudential theories into practice, setting the
example for other state courts to follow. One legal historian commented:
Through the efforts of these prominent legal educators in their capacity as
judges, the method for reducing issues of legal precedents to questions of legal
principles was firmly established into American legal practice. The next step was
to gain acceptance for a process whereby these principles could be judged
against comparative standards. This was an essential aspect of the modified
doctrine of stare decisis for it provided the legal system with the predictability
necessary to protect a society from governmental harassment. The comparative
standards used to judge precedents introduced by America's first generation of
legal educators and successfully integrated into American legal practice were:

utility, logic, morality and conflicting American law and the policy behind the
law.'

295. KLAFrE, supra note 240, at 75 (discussing Goix v. Low, I Johns. Cas. 341 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1800), rev'd,
2 Johns. Cas. 480 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1802)).
296. HORWrrZ, supra note 231, at 27. As one legal historian has noted, in the post-Revolutionary period,
courts and legal educators began to "integrate" a "systematic and predictable method for judging precedents
introduced by America's first generation of legal educators." KLAFrER, supra note 240, at 77. The first part of this
method involved reducing precedents to their "fundamental principles," by which future cases could be evaluated.
id.
297. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
298. FRIEDMAN, supra note 72, at 239.
299. See id. ("The Litchfield school spawned a number of imitators.").
300. See KLAFrER, supra note 240, app. 2.
301. See id. at 67-93 (showing that "a predominant aim of American legal educators" following the
Revolution was to limit the influence of English precedents through their teaching, treatise writing, and actions as
prominent judges); see also ALBERT J. HARNO, LEGAL EDUCATION INTHE UNITED STATES: A REPORT PREPARED

FOR THE SURVEY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 21-28 (1953) (noting the use of Blackstone's Commentaries by legal
educators); Andrew M. Siegel, Note, "To Learn and Make Respectable Hereafter": The Litchfield Law School
in Cultural Context, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1978, 2013-14 (1998) (discussing Reeve's use of principles and
precedents).
302. FRIEDMAN, supra note 72, at 240.
303. KLAFrER, supra note 240, at 69, 74.
304. Id. at 78. Klafter discussed the manner in which each of these comparative standards was applied by
the various states. See id. at 79-93.
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Thus, the instrumentalist view expressed by some legal historians does not fully
describe the behavior of the state courts in the post-Revolutionary era. It is apparent
that, although state courts did grow increasingly willing to depart from English
precedents, they did so based on a systematic method, which was incorporated into
a modified doctrine of stare decisis.
Furthermore, despite the fledgling states' willingness to modify the doctrine of
stare decisis, they still took the doctrine very seriously. Although state courts
deviated from English precedents, they were far less likely to deviate from their
own precedents. As a result, a two-tiered doctrine of stare decisis developed °5 in
which English precedents were not accorded as much weight as American
precedents. Moreover, in many states, the unmodified doctrine of stare decisis
remained the rule.3" Finally, even in the cases where courts did depart from
precedent, they still felt the need to address those precedents, and they offered
reasons for abandoning them.
(c) Precedent as Understood by the Framers and Ratifiers of the Constitution
There is not a great deal of direct evidence to draw from in this period. Professor
Norman Williams has discussed the difficulty regarding the sparse historical record:
"The Framers never engaged in a focused discussion of the role of precedent in
federal court adjudication, much less whether.. .Article III required some respect for
precedent and, if so, in what form."30 7 I am not aware of any mention of the doctrine
of stare decisis in the Constitutional Convention.3 8 Likewise, there does not appear
to be any mention of the doctrine of stare decisis in the records of the state ratifying
conventions." On the other hand, there is some historical evidence, and what there
is certainly merits close examination.
Tellingly, both opponents and proponents of the new Constitution argued for
their respective positions based on the assumption thatjudicial power included stare
decisis.31 ° As one scholar has noted, "they all expected the new federal courts to

305. This could really be considered a three-tiered doctrine: precedents concerning property and reliance
issues were accorded the most weight, American precedents were accorded more weight than English precedents,
and English precedents (unrelated to property interests) were accorded the least weight. See Lee, supra note 2, at
651 (arguing that American courts in the late eighteenth century accorded more weight to precedents involving
property interests).
306. See, e.g., Oliver v. Newburyport Ins. Co., 3 Mass. (2 Tyng) 37 (Mass. 1807); Fisher v. Morgan, 1N.J.L.
125 (N.J. 1792); Young v. Erwin, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 323 (N.C. 1796); Hannum v. Askew, I Yeates 25 (Pa. 1791).
307. Williams, supra note 2, at 766.
308. See JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., int'l ed. 1999).
Most of the references made regarding the judicial branch of the federal government were concerned with whether
that branch should be given a power ofjudicial review of all statutes passed by the legislature, id. at 51,56, 67, 69,
294, 300, 405, how long federal judges should serve, id. at 58, 277, 473-74, whether the Supreme Court should
be involved in impeachment proceedings, id. at 472, 535-36, and what method should be used to appoint the
judges. Id. at 56-58, 97, 274-77, 300-03.
309. See generally 1-5 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE
ADOPTION OFTHE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA,
IN 1787 (William S. Hein & Co. 1996) (2d ed. 1861).

310. See Murphy, supra note 34, at 1076 ("Both sides in the ratification debates subscribed to this
understanding and shared Madison's expectation that the new federal Constitution would, like lesser law, be subject
to such precedential 'fixative' effects."). In light of the direct evidence from the Framers and Ratifiers discussed
below, I think Professor Paulsen's argument that "no such claim (or accusation) [that "judicial Power" included
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adhere to something like the declaratory theory's doctrine of precedent."3 1 One of
the earliest references to the doctrine of precedent in the debates leading up to
Ratification of the Constitution appears in The Anti-Federalist Papers.3' 2 The
Federal Farmer was concerned about the lack of precedents to guide the federal
courts, especially with regard to decisions that in England had been left to courts
of equity: "[W]e have no precedents in this country, as yet, to regulate the divisions
in equity as in Great Britain; equity, therefore, in the supreme court for many years
'
will be mere discretion." 313
This comment reveals both an understanding that
precedent acts as a binding limitation on a federal court's decision-making power,
and also a recognition that the judicial power exercised by federal courts would, in
time, create binding precedents.
The complaint by the Federal Farmer-"mere discretion"-exemplifies the
concern of the Framers and Ratifiers (along with Blackstone and others) about
judges exercising arbitrary discretion. The theme of cabining judicial discretion
through precedent crossed party lines as is seen below in the discussion of the
Federalists, Hamilton and Madison.
Unlike the Federal Farmer who was concerned about the lack of binding
precedent, another important Anti-Federalist writer, Brutus, feared the opposite
danger, namely, too many precedents. Brutus feared that the courts' precedents
would metastasize and eventually swallow the freedom of the citizens of the nation:
Perhaps nothing could have been better conceived to facilitate the abolition of
the state governments than the constitution of the judicial. They will be able to
extend the limits of the general government gradually, and by insensible degrees,
and to accommodate themselves to the temper of the people. Their decisions on
the meaning of the constitution[3 4] will commonly take place in cases which
arise between individuals, with which the public will not be generally
acquainted; one adjudication will form a precedent to the next, and this to a
following one. These cases will immediately affect individuals only; so that a
series of determinations will probably take place before even the people will be
informed of them.315
Brutus believed that federal courts would issue binding constitutionalprecedents.3 16
And although Brutus did not express a fear of uncabined judicial discretion, as did
the Federal Farmer, his premise-precedent binds federal judges-remained.

a concept of precedent] was ever made" by the Framers or Ratifiers or "any prominent opponent of the
Constitution" is too broad. See Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1571.
311. Murphy, supra note 34, at 1096.
312. The Anti-Federalists were a rather disorganized group of people, not evenly spread throughout the states,
who opposed ratification of the Constitution. See generally, e.g., HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTIFEDERALISTS WERE FOR: THE PoLIrICAL THOUGHT OF THE OPPONENTS OF THE CONsrTrrxTON

(1981).

313. Letter from the Federal Farmer III (Oct. 10, 1787), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANn-FEDERALIST 234, 244
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (emphasis added). For a discussion of precedent that focuses on this issue, see
generally Murphy, supra note 34.
314. Contra Williams, supra note 2, at 803 ("[N]one of [the Framers] linked their conception of the role of
precedent to the Constitution....").
315. Brutus XV (Mar. 20, 1788), in THE ANTI-FEDERALISTPAPERSANDTHECONSTITUIONALCONVENTION
DEBATES 308 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986) (emphasis added).
316. For an extended discussion of Brutus's arguments and the reasons why he believed that federal courts
would be bound by precedent, see Murphy, supra note 34, at 1108-13.
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Alexander Hamilton penned Federalist78 in response to the concerns similar to
those expressed by the Federal Farmer and Brutus. Hamilton described the nature
of the federal judiciary and then defended the need for lifetime appointment of
judges. In Hamilton's view, the judicial branch was the "least dangerous" of the
three branches envisioned by the Framers because its power was limited by the
Constitution in several ways.3 17 One of the limits Hamilton discussed was the
requirement of following precedent. In Hamilton's words:
It has been frequently remarked, with great propriety, that a voluminous code of
laws is one of the inconveniences necessarily connected with the advantages of
a free government. To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents, which serve
to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before
them; and it will readily be conceived, from the variety of controversies which
grow out of the folly and wickedness of mankind, that the records of those
precedents must unavoidably swell to a very considerable bulk, and must
demand long and laborious study to acquire a competent knowledge of them.3"'
Hamilton's discussion of precedent is far from exhaustive. Indeed, Hamilton only
raised the issue as part of an argument in favor of lifetime appointment for federal
judges: only men who were engaged in the craft for life would have the experience
and time to study the "considerable bulk" of precedents that would bind them. Still,
it shows that, at the very least, Hamilton presumed that federal judges would, like
the common law judges with whom he was familiar, create and work with binding
precedents.3 19 Indeed, Hamilton followed the common theme of tying an accumulation of precedent to limiting judicial discretion, a value central to Hamilton's vision
of the limited role of judges as exercising judgment and not will.
James Madison had a relatively clear understanding of the doctrine of precedent
and the role it played as part of judicial power. In a letter to Samuel Johnson in the
months preceding Ratification, he lamented that, at times, the meaning of certain
parts of the Constitution was difficult to determine conclusively.32 ° Contrary to
Brutus, he looked forward to the accumulation of precedents because such
precedents would help to settle the meaning of the Constitution: "Among other
difficulties, the exposition of the Constitution is frequently a copious source, and
must continue so until its meaning on all great points shall have been settled by
precedents. 32' Madison presented these same thoughts publicly during the period
of Ratification, in Federalist 37, arguing that precedents are necessary to
"liquidate[]" the meaning of the Constitution.32 2

317. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 140, at 402.
318. Id. at407.
319. Some scholars have argued against excessive reliance on this passage from Federalist78. See Lee, supra
note 2, at 663-64; Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1572-76. I am simply using the passage as one further piece of
evidence that the Framers and Ratifiers accepted precedent as part of their background understanding of the nature
of judicial power.
320. See Letter from James Madison to Samuel Johnston (June 21, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 249, 250 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1979).
321. Id. But see Williams, supranote 2, at 818 (arguing that it is unclear whether Madison's use of the word
"precedents" applied exclusively to judicial precedents).
322. See THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 183 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds.,
Gideon ed. 2001) (arguing, in the context of discussing the difficulties the Constitutional Convention faced in
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More than forty years later, Madison again touched on the importance of the
doctrine of precedent. Madison described the "authoritative force" of "judicial
precedents" as stemming from the "obligations arising from judicial expositions of
law on succeeding judges."323 He justified the binding force of judicial precedent
by appealing to certainty and stability.324 Madison rejected the claim that later
judges were free to disregard constitutional precedent they deemed erroneous:
Yet, has it ever been supposed that he (the judge) was required or at liberty to
disregard all precedents, however solemnly repeated and regularly observed,
and, by giving effect to his own abstract and individual opinions, to disturb the
established course of practice in the business of the community?...
There is, in fact and in common understanding, a necessity of regarding a
course of practice, as above characterized, in the light of a legal rule of
interpreting a law, and there is a like necessity of considering it a constitutional
rule of interpreting a Constitution."
Thus, Madison, like Hamilton, understood that judicial power included the doctrine
of binding precedent.3 26 And like his contemporaries, Madison saw binding
precedent as a means to limit judicial discretion, which was inconsistent with the
limited role of the judiciary.
In the period following Ratification, William Cranch, the second reporter for the
Supreme Court, began his first edition of the Supreme Court Reports with a preface
discussing the importance of precedents:
In a government which is emphatically styled a government of laws, the least
[A]nd perhaps,
possible range ought to be left for the discretion of the judge ....
nothing conduces more to that object than the publication of reports. Every case
decided is a check upon the judge: he cannot decide a similar case differently,
without strong reasons, which, for his own justification, he will wish to make
public.327
According to Cranch, central to the Rule of Law was limited judicial discretion, and
central to constraining federal judges in their exercise of the judicial power was
precedent.
Given the common law background which was pervasive in the legal education,
legal practice, and thought32 8 of the Framers and Ratifiers, it is not surprising that

forming "a proper plan," that is, the Constitution, that "[a] 11new laws" must have "their meaning... liquidated and
ascertained by a series of.. .adjudications").
323. Letter from James Madison to Charles Jared Ingersoll, supra note 174, at 391.
324. Id. ("Mhe good of society requires that the rules of conduct of its members should be certain and
known....").
325. Id. at 392.
326. Madison contends that the judge's oath to uphold the law extends by implication to the 'legal
rule of interpreting a law,' including the rule that directs the judge to give due regard to
precedents... .[T]he judicial oath provides no basis for adoption of the judge's individual
understanding of a constitutional provision at the expense of precedent.
Lee, supra note 2, at 711.
327. 1 WILLIAM CRANCH, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DECIDED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, at iii (1804). But see Williams, supranote 2, at 825 (arguing that Cranch's commentary was "self-

serving" because Cranch had "an incentive to laud the value of precedent so as to encourage sales of his reports").
328. See FORREST MCDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1985) (arguing that the intellectual lives of the Framers and Ratifiers was formed by the common
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all of the evidence we have of the Framers' and Ratifiers' views on the nature of
judicial power is consistent with the declaratory theory of precedent. Others have
recognized as well that the declaratory theory of precedent "was entrenched in
'
common-law jurisprudence at and about the time of founding."329
This connection was made explicit in James Wilson's writings. Wilson argued
that "ij]udicial decisions are the principal and most authentic" proof of what the law
is and "every prudent and cautious judge will appreciate them [because] his duty
and his business is not to make the law, but to interpret and apply it."33 This view
of precedent required courts, as Professor Murphy has argued, to "defer to
precedents that fall within what might be characterized as a zone of reasonable legal
interpretation[:].. .ajudge should not reject a precedent merely because she would
have decided the case differently given the chance in a case of first impression."33 '
For instance, Chief Justice of the Connecticut Supreme Court, Zephaniah Swift,
argued that "when a court ha[s] solemnly and deliberately decided any question or
point of law, that adjudication bec[omes] a precedent in all cases of a similar nature,
and operate[s] with the force and authority of a law. 332
From the foregoing analysis it is clear that, despite the relative dearth of evidence
from the period on the subject, all of the direct evidence discussed above shows that
the Framers and Ratifiers did have a relatively clear understanding of the role
precedent would play in the judicial power exercised by federal judges: federal
judges would create and in turn be bound by precedents. In other words, the
doctrine of precedent was one of the background assumptions involved in the
formation of the federal judiciary. Further, the direct evidence coincides with what
one would expect to find given the broader historical legal context discussed earlier:
stare decisis was part of the background of their lawyerly understanding of judicial
power. The binding nature of federal precedent was also a product of the Framers'
and Ratifiers' goal of containing judicial discretion to accord with the judges'
limited role in a republic.
Indeed, it is the very lack of a comprehensive discussion of stare decisis by the
Framers and Ratifiers that makes it likely that they understood and accepted it as a
basic foundation of a workable judiciary. After all, the simple fact is that there are
'
many topics regarding which the Framers never had a "focused discussion,"333
but
about which we are relatively certain they had a coherent understanding. For
instance, the nature of "Court" is not defined in Article 111, nor was it extensively
discussed at the time of the Framing and Ratification.33 4 The most plausible reason
is that to the Framers and Ratifiers, from their common law background, the term

law, among other things).
329. Murphy, supra note.34, at 1086.
330. 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 502 (Robert Green McClosky ed., 1967); see also id. at 524 ("[A]
judgment is a declaration of the law.").
331. Murphy, supra note 34, at 1086-87.
332.

1 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 40 (Windham, John

Byrne 1795).
333. Williams, supra note 2, at 766.
334. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of FederalCourtsand the Structural Constitution, 86
IOWA L. REv. 735,799-825 (2001) (gathering historical evidence regarding the evolution of courts in England and
the United States up to the Framing and Ratification).
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"Court" referred to the common law institution of courts as defined by the social
practice. This suggests that if the Framers and Ratifiers thought that the doctrine of
precedent was something altogether mysterious, or that it was a new concept, then
they likely would have discussed it in great detail.335 This is especially true since
both opponents and proponents based arguments on the assumption that federal
judges would create and be bound by precedents. The fact that in each of the
instances when one of the Framers mentioned the doctrine of precedent it was to
draw on the doctrine as a supporting argument for a larger-more controversialclaim leads to the reasonable conclusion that such a doctrine was always seen as a
background principle, which apparently needed no greater explanation.
It is significant that thirty-one of the fifty-five delegates to the Constitutional
Convention were lawyers.336 As I have demonstrated in the preceding two
subsections, a doctrine of precedent was part of the basic structure of the English
and colonial legal systems. Since so many of the Framers and Ratifiers were
lawyers, it would be remarkable if they did not share an understanding of the
doctrine of precedent, which was so central to the common law.
Finally, many historians who do not attribute a doctrine of stare decisis to the
Framers and Ratifiers instead argue that a "strict" view of precedent rather suddenly
appeared early in the nineteenth century.337 Based on the evidence provided in this
Article, I believe that the more plausible description of the history is that the
Framers and Ratifiers had a conception of binding precedent and that-instead of
its appearance out of whole cloth-later courts employed a stricter conception of
stare decisis that had evolved out of the earlier understanding.33
(d) Practice and Understanding of Precedent in Federal Courts after the
Ratification of the Constitution Until 1800
In this subsection I conclude with a discussion of the understanding and practice
of the doctrine of precedent in the newly-created federal courts.339 My focus is on
the earliest federal court decisions, beginning with the Judiciary Act of 1789 until
the dawn of the nineteenth century.

335. The Framers did, after all, engage in a "focused discussion" of the nature and powers of the federal
judiciary itself. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78-82 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing the federal judiciary).
336. FRIEDMAN, supra note 72, at 59.
337. See Price, supra note 2, at 84 (stating that "historians have located the beginning of a 'strict' doctrine
of precedent only in the post-founding period" and collecting citations).
338. See id. at 99 ("The immediate post-Founding generation behaved as though starting with precedent was
a natural obligation of courts.").
339. Although I do not discuss state court practice following ratification, it is clear that state courts, like their
federal counterparts, continued the practice of following precedent. For example, in the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court decision, Kerlin'sLessee v. Bull, I U.S. (I Dall.) 175,178-79 (Pa. 1786), the Court described the declaratory
theory of precedent it followed and then followed a prior case even "though some may not [have] be[en] satisfied
in their private judgment," because it enunciated a "rule of property."
Further, the legal practice in the state courts was heavily focused on precedent. For instance, in
Commonwealth v. Coxe, where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court evaluated a dispute over tracts of land located
along the Ohio and Allegheny Rivers, an attorney relied on a number ofauthorities supporting his argument. 4 U.S.
(4 Dall.) 170 (Pa. 1800). Alexander Dallas, the reporter, summarized the arguments: "Stare decisis, is a maxim to
be held forever sacred, on questions of property; and, in the present instance, applies with peculiar force, as the rule
was given by the state herself, through the medium of her officers...." Id. at 192.
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A review of the reports reveals that the legal practice in the early federal courts
included frequent citation to, discussion of, and reliance upon precedent. For
3 "° the
example, in United States v. Callender,
United States was attempting to
prosecute Callender for seditious libel against President Adams. The defendant's
attorney, Hays, argued that the allegedly libelous book could not be introduced as
evidence supporting the indictment because the indictment failed to name the book
itself.34 1
Hays argued that he had reviewed "fifteen or twenty cases" that supported his
argument and explained three such cases in more detail.342 After doing so, Hays
argued that "the attorney for the United States cannot give a single case" against his
position.34 3 Circuit Justice Chase then distinguished Hays' cases and relied on a
contrary case (drawn from his memory) to overrule Hays' objection. 3" There are
countless similar examples showing that stare decisis was a ubiquitous feature of
early federal court legal practice as employed by litigants, 5 the courts,3" and even
the reporters.347
The earliest explicit discussion of the doctrine of stare decisis in the federal
courts appears to have occurred in Jenningsv. Carson," three years after the birth
of the federal judiciary.349 In Jennings,the District Court of Pennsylvania evaluated
a claim under admiralty law regarding a challenge to the capture of a Dutch sloop
and her cargo during the Revolutionary War.350 The sloop was captured by a
privateer schooner owned by Joseph Carson."' Carson maintained that the Dutch
sloop was carrying goods "belonging to the subjects of Great Britain, contrary to the
regulations and laws of the then congress.
The sloop was condemned after ajury

340. 25 F. Cas. 239 (C.C.D. Va. 1800) (No. 14,709).
341. Id. at 246.
342. Id. at 247.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 249.
345. See, e.g., United States v. Maunier, 26 F. Cas. 1210, 1211 (C.C.D.N.C. 1792) (No. 15,746) (defense
counsel citing precedent); Harvey v. Harvey, 1 Del. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Del. 1793), availableat 1793 WL 618 (both
parties' counsel citing precedent); United States v. Ravara, 27 F. Cas. 714, 715 (C.C.D. Pa. 1794) (No. 16,122a)
(government counsel citing precedent); Parasset v. Gautier, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 329, 331 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (defense
counsel citing precedent); Geyger's Lessee v. Geyger, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 332 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (defense counsel
citing precedent); United States v. Insurgents of Pa., 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 334, 339 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (government
counsel citing precedent); United States v. Stewart, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 343, 344 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (defense counsel
citing precedent).
346. See, e.g., Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402, 407 (1792) (opinion of Wilson, J.); id. at 408
(opinion of Cushing, J.); Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 415,417 (1793) (opinion of Iredell, J.); Chisholm
v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 429, 437-39, 442-44 (1793) (opinion of Iredell, J.); Vanhorne's Lessee v.
Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 303, 317 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795); Dixon v. The Cyrus, 7 F. Cas. 755, 756, 757 (D.C.D. Pa.
1789) (No. 3,930); Weeks v. The Catharina Maria, 29 F. Cas. 579, 579 (D.C.D. Pa. 1790) (No. 17,351); Findlay
v. The William, 9 F. Cas. 57,60 (D.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 4,790); Tunno v. Preary, 24 F. Cas. 323, 323 (D.C.D.S.C.
1794) (No. 14,238); Jansen v. The Vrow Christina Magdalena, 13 F. Cas. 356,359 (D.C.D.S.C. 1794) (No. 7,216).
347. See, e.g., Rice v. The Polly & Kitty, 20 F. Cas. 666, 667 n.2 (D.C.D. Pa. 1789) (No. 11,754).
348. 13 F. Cas. 540 (D.C.D. Pa. 1792) (No. 7,281).
349. The Constitution established the Supreme Court and authorized Congress to establish the lower federal
courts. U.S. CONST. art. Il, § 1,cl.
1. Congress passed the Judiciary Act in 1789 to create these lower federal courts.
See generally, ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992).
350. Jennings, 13 F. Cas. at 540.
351. Id.at540-41.
352. Id.
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trial in the state court of admiralty of New Jersey.353 Jennings, representing the
interests of the owner of the Dutch sloop, brought suit against Carson's executors,
claiming that the sloop had been taken in violation of the law of the sea.354 Carson's
executors defended the capture and relied on the decision by the New Jersey state
court of admiralty.355 Jennings countered by arguing that the decision of the New
Jersey state court had been reversed by the Court of Appeals of the United States
in 1780.356
The district court first looked to the English case of Case ofLindo andRodneybrought to the court's attention by counsel-to evaluate whether it had jurisdiction
to hear prize appeals. 35 7 It then examined the history of admiralty courts in the
United States and the American colonies.35 Judge Peters determined that the rule
of admiralty law created by Lord Mansfield in Case of Lindo and Rodney was not
found in any American admiralty courts-it was unique to the English courts.359 He
concluded that the United States was no longer bound by English precedent in
admiralty cases and held that the Constitution granted jurisdiction to federal courts
to hear all admiralty cases: "Acting as we now do in a national, and not a dependent
capacity, I cannot conceive that we are bound to follow the practice in England,
more than that of our own, or any other nation."3
This case is instructive because it shows that the earliest federal courts were
familiar with the requirements of the doctrine of stare decisis. Even though the court
did not follow the Case of Lindo and Rodney, the fact that the advocates before the
court argued from precedent, and that the judge felt required to articulate his
reasons for departing from that precedent, demonstrates that federal judges
understood their judicial power to include a respect for precedent.
Eight years later, the Circuit Court for the District of Pennsylvania considered
the requirement of following precedent. In the famous Case of Fries,the Circuit

353. Id.at541.
354. Id. at 540-41.
355. Id.at 541.
356. Id. The Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture was a creature of the Continental Congress. After the
beginning of the Revolutionary War, merchants complained of unlawful condemnations by the state courts of
admiralty. Congress established a system whereby merchants could appeal the judgments of the state courts of
admiralty to a committee of Congress. In 1780 the committee was dissolved and the Court of Appeals was
established in its place. For a discussion of the problems of admiralty law in the newly-formed states, see generally
Matthew P. Harrington, The Legacy of the Colonial Vice-Admiralty Courts (PartI1), 27 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 323,
339-43 (1996).
Although Congress claimed the power to overrule state courts of admiralty in the matter of prize
appeals, this authority was contingent on the cooperation of the state courts. Because neither the
Standing Committee nor the congressional Court of Appeals possessed the ability to enforce its
decrees, the confederation period was marked by a series ofconflicts between the state admiralty
courts and Congress over the final disposition of prize cases. Having no marshal, Congress was
left to rely on state courts for the implementation of its decrees; but states were not always
willing to cooperate.
Id. at 343. This seems to have been the situation in Jennings.
357. Case of Lindo and Rodney, discussed in LeCaux v. Eden (1781) 99 Eng. Rep. 375,385 n.1 (KB.).
358. Jennings, 13 F. Cas. at 542.
359. Id.
360. Id. Furthermore, Judge Peters asserted that "[t]he admiralty proceeds by a law which considers all
nations as one community, and should not be tied down to the precedent of one nation..." Id. Thus, it would be
inappropriate to follow the precedents established by one nation.
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Court evaluated the conviction of John Fries for treason.36 ' Fries had been the
"ringleader" of a group of men who had resisted enforcement of federal tax statutes
362
requiring property owners to pay taxes on the value of their slaves and 3lands.
63
States.
United
the
against
war
levying
for
Fries was charged with treason
Fries argued that he was not guilty of treason as defined by the Constitution. 3"
Specifically, Fries complained that the judge had given an incorrect instruction to
the jury that resisting enforcement of a federal statute constituted treason.365 In
essence, Fries argued that the judge had misconstrued the constitutional definition
of treason. 3"
Judge Chase began by pointing out that the Constitution defined treason in
Article HL.367 Judge Chase then outlined how previous federal courts had interpreted
the Constitution's definition of treason in two cases of insurrection in Pennsylvania
from 1795.368 Judge Chase concluded, based on this precedent:
The[sel decisions, according to the best established principles of our jurisprudence, became a precedent for all courts of equal or inferior jurisdiction; a precedent which, though not altogether obligatory, ought to be viewed with great
respect, especially by the court in which it was made, and ought never to be
369
departed from, but on the fullest and clearest conviction of its incorrectness.
Judge Chase believed himself bound by precedents on the constitutionaldefinition
of treason.37 Chase "considered the law as settled by those decisions, with the
correctness of which on full consideration he was entirely satisfied; and by the
authority of which he should have deemed himself bound, even had he regarded the
question as doubtful in itself."'37' Hence, from its earliest days, the federal courts
gave significant respect to precedent.
Contrary to the claims of some scholars,372 the Supreme Court, from its inception,
frequently looked to precedent to guide it. One recent study evaluated the reliance

361. 9 F. Cas. 924 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 5,127).
362. Id. at 935.
363. Id. at 924.

364. Id. at 935.
365. See id. at 930.
366. Id. at 935.
367. Id. at 930 (citing U.S. CONST. art. Ia § 3, cl.1).
368. Id. at 931 (discussing United States v. Mitchell, 26 F. Cas. 1277 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No. 15,788); United
States v. Vigol, 28 F. Cas. 376 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (No. 16,621)).
369. Id. at 935.

370. See id. at 936 ("[1] considered [mylself and the court as bound by the authority of the former
decisions."); see id. ("As the court [i.e., Chase] held itself bound by the former decisions....").
371. Id. at 936. Turning to Fries's further allegations that his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel
had been violated, Chase noted that it was not the defense counsel's duty to decide what evidence or what
interpretation of the law should be presented to the jury. Id. at 938. In Judge Chase's words:
As counsel, they owe to the person accused, diligence, fidelity and secrecy, and to the court and
jury, due and correct information, according to the best of their knowledge and ability, on every
matter of law which they attempt to adduce in argument. The court, on the other hand, hath
power, and is bound in duty, to decide and direct what evidence, whether by records or by
precedents of decisions in courts ofjustice, is proper to be admitted for the establishment of any
matter of law or fact.
Id. Fries was later pardoned by President John Adams. See id. at 944.
372. See Healy, supra note 38, at 85 ("[T]he content of the Court's opinions showed little concern for
precedent.").
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on precedent by the early Supreme Court.373 From 1787 to 1815, the Supreme Court
decided 706 cases. Of those, 275 included "references to legal citations, 3 74 most
of which relied on common law precedents to reach their decisions.375
From 1787 to 1800, the Court relied on common law precedents 667 times and
cited its own precedent eight times.376 However, there was a marked shift in the
pattern of the Court's reliance beginning in 1801. From 1801 to 1805, the Court
relied on common law precedents seventeen times and cited its own precedents nine
times. 377 From 1806 to 1815, the Court relied on common law precedents forty-five
times, and cited its own precedents forty-three times. 378 Thus, beginning around
1801, the Court began to rely on its own precedents with greater relative frequency
than English precedents. 379 This shift is attributable to a critical mass of its own
precedent as the most recent authority on legal issues, which replaced citation to
earlier, and less authoritative, English common law and other sources.W Further,
during this same period, the Court also frequently cited lower federal court
precedent and state court precedent.38 '
Thus, it is apparent that the federal judiciary followed precedent from its
formation. In the beginning, the federal courts looked to the precedents of the
colonial and early state courts, along with the precedents of the English common
law. As time passed and the courts developed their own corpus of case law, they
increasingly relied on their own precedents, discounting the English precedents.
iii. The Common Law and the Constitution
The discussion above shows that by the time of the framing and ratification of
the Constitution, stare decisis was an acknowledged component of judicial power.
This understanding of precedent is applicable to the context of constitutional
precedent for a number of reasons.
First, there is no logical impediment to the application of stare decisis to an
authoritative legal text such as the Constitution. Indeed, the pervasive current
practice where constitutional precedent is accorded precedential respect belies such
a contention. I argued above that according binding effect to some--even mistaken
-constitutional precedent is required by the common good. This makes application

373. James F. Spriggs et al., The Political Development of a Norm Respecting Precedent in the American
Judiciary (Apr. 15-18, 2004) (unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science
Association) (on file with author).
374. Id. at 12.
375. Id. ("[R]eferences to the common law outnumber references to all other legal citations.").
376. Id. at 21 tbl.3.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Overall, our preliminary findings indicate that, for the U.S. Supreme Court, English
common law seemed to become less important for it over the first 20 years of its existence, while
its own precedent, and precedent and legal authorities from within the U.S. (the state and federal
constitutions, for example) became more important.
Id. at 14.
380. See id. at 12 ("'his [high percentage of citation to common law rather than Supreme Court cases] is not
surprising, given that the U.S. was less than 30 years old during the years we have analyzed so far."); id. ("Indeed,
as a new Court, that decided very few cases from its beginning, it simply did not have many precedents from which
to draw.").
381. Id. at 13 (discussing table 3); id. at 20 tbl.2.
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of stare decisis to constitutional text not only logically possible but normatively
attractive.
Second, common law precedent in England, in the colonies, and in the newly
independent states prior to the advent ofludicially enforceable written constitutions
often included precedents interpreting and applying statutes which were the
supreme law of the land. The concept of precedent where later courts give significant respect to previous applications of, for example, parliamentary statutes,382 is
analogous to federal courts following precedential applications of the Constitution.
Both situations involve an authoritative text that is changeable only through specific
means that do not include judicial alteration. Therefore, the concept of stare decisis
first at home in the common law context is applicable to constitutional precedent.
Perhaps most importantly, the original meaning of "judicial Power" requires
federal courts to exercise significant respect for constitutional precedent.383 This is
a non-negotiable demand that our written Constitution places on federal judges.
Thus, regardless of questions on exactly how this command should play out in the
constitutional context-questions this Article does not address-the constitutional
command remains.
2. Criteria to Determine When Judges Should Overrule Nonoriginalist
Precedent
Normally, in a constitutional case, a judge following an originalist methodology
must attempt to discern and apply the original meaning of the text of the
Constitution. However, when faced with a nonoriginalist precedent purporting to
interpret the Constitution, a judge's duty is more complicated. A judge in such a
situation must overrule the precedent unless doing so would gravely harm society's
pursuit of the common good. To determine whether overruling a nonoriginalist
precedent would gravely harm society's pursuit of the common good, a judge must
weigh (at least) the following three factors: 311 (1) the degree of departure of the
nonoriginalist precedent from the original meaning of the Constitution, (2) the
impact on Rule of Law values caused by overruling the precedent, and (3) the nonlegal justness 385 of the precedent. 38 6 Making these determinations requires judges
with judicial virtue.

382. See Akhil Reed Amar, On Lawson on Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 39, 39-40 (1994)
(arguing that the English practice of following prior interpretations of parliamentary statutes-the supreme law of
the land in England-provided an analogue from which one could argue that the "judicial Power" in Article Ill
included the authority to follow incorrect interpretations of the Constitution).
383. See supra notes 307-338 and accompanying text.
384. For a list of factors involving some of the same substantive considerations as those examined here, see
Monaghan, supra note 6, at 756-63.
385. I will describe this concept below.
386. I do not discuss whether the conclusions reached in this Article detract from Professor Paulsen's
argument that Congress may statutorily abrogate the effect of stare decisis. See Paulsen, supra note 2. My
preliminary thought is that they do not, especially in light of the historical evidence of congressional control of
judicial procedures marshaled by Paulsen. See id. at 1567-70, 1582-90; see also Murphy, supra note 34, at 1139
(agreeing with Paulsen's analysis).
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a. Degree of Departure
The first factor, the degree to which the nonoriginalist precedent departs from the
original meaning, directly addresses the legitimacy of the Supreme Court's and the
nonoriginalist precedent's authority. The Supreme Court may legitimately overrule
an act of the elected branches only if the elected branches contravened the
(determinate) original meaning of the Constitution. A Supreme Court justice's duty
is to enforce the prudential social ordering that has enabled our society to
effectively pursue the common good. Part of that social ordering is originalism. The
more a precedent deviates from the original meaning the stronger is the judge's
obligation to correct the deviation.
The obligation ofjudges to reverse nonoriginalist decisions varies positively with
the decision's variation from the original meaning for a number of reasons. First,
in practice it is often difficult to judge with complete accuracy whether and how
much a particular decision deviates from the original meaning. This counsels
caution and requires judges to analyze the degree to which a decision does or does
not depart from the original meaning. In some cases it is easy to see that a decision
greatly deviates from the original meaning. For example, few if any scholars argue
that the doctrine of substantive due process is faithful to the original meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and most scholars agree that the
doctrine is a radical departure from the Clause's original meaning. 387 However, the
bulk of potentially nonoriginalist decisions are not so clear-cut. Do cases holding
that the Equal Protection Clause governs all racial classifications depart from the
original meaning of the Clause, and, if so, how far?388 Or, what about cases that
First Amendment to nonextend the protection of the Religion Clauses of 3the
389 and beyond monotheistic beliefs? 9
beliefs
theistic
Another reason why a judge's duty is variable is that the perceived legitimacy of
the exercise of constitutional judicial review varies depending on the clarity and
extent to which a decision deviates from the original meaning. The more a decision
deviates, the more likely it jeopardizes the valuable role the proper exercise of
constitutional judicial review plays in preserving our constitutional social ordering.
Constitutional judicial review is essential to our society's ability to govern itself
through time by keeping the elected branches within their delegated powers. Since
the average American's view of the proper exercise of constitutional judicial review
is roughly characterized as originalism, 39 ' deviations from the original meaning

387. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 69, at 18 ("[There is simply no avoiding the fact that the word that follows
'due' is 'process."').
388. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (holding that all racial
classifications are subject to strict scrutiny).
389. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965) (defining religion in the draft-exemption
statute to include nontheistic beliefs purportedly to avoid the constitutional issue of an establishment); Torcasco
v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488,495 (1961) (defining religion to include theistic and nontheistic beliefs, such as "Secular
Humanism"); see also Lee J. Strang, The Meaning of "Religion" in the First Amendment, 40 DuQ. L. REv. 181,

200-04 (2002) [hereinafter Strang, First Amendment] (discussing the evolution of the Court's definition of
religion).
390. See Strang, FirstAmendment, supra note 389, at 210-37 (arguing that the original meaning of religion
in the First Amendment included only theistic belief systems).
391. See FALLON, supra note 6, at 13 ("When quizzed about the appropriate role of the Supreme Court in
American government, most law students-and I would guess most interested citizens-tend almost reflexively
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threaten public acceptance of constitutional judicial review and threaten our
society's ability to abide by our constitutional social ordering.392 This is because,
absent following the original meaning, most Americans believe that the Supreme
Court is merely imposing its own policy preferences on society.393 Leaving other
factors aside, 94 the greater a decision deviates from the original meaning, the more
suspicious Americans are of the Supreme Court's exercise of constitutional judicial
review.3 95
b. Rule of Law Values
The second factor judges must consider when addressing nonoriginalist
precedent is the impact on Rule of Law values caused by overruling or limiting the
to rely on a theory that has been labeled most recently as 'originalism."'); id. at 123 ("As a sociological matter,
there can be little doubt that the written Constitution is widely perceived as having a claim to legitimacy that the
unwritten Constitution does not."); see also ELY, supra note 69, at 12 ("[Originalism] does seem to retain the
substantial virtue of fitting better our ordinary notion of how law works: if your job is to enforce the Constitution
then the Constitution is what you should be enforcing, not whatever may happen to strike you as a good idea at the
time."); Saikrishna B. Prakash, Overcoming the Constitution, 91 GEo. L.J. 407, 434 (2003) (reviewing RICHARD
H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001)) ("What makes originalism so intuitively attractive?
Most people probably comprehend that originalism is the only mode of interpretation that is consistent with our
willingness to submit to a lawmaker."); A Newsweek Poll: Bork, the Court andthe Issues, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 14,
1987, at 26 (describing a September 1987 Gallup Poll which concluded that 52% of Americans believe that Supeme
Court justices should "apply the intentions of the original authors of the Constitution," while only 40% thought
that the justices should "apply their own values as well" as the original intentions of the authors).
392. See SCALIA, supra note 15, at 46-47 (arguing that today the "American people have been converted to
belief in The Living Constitution" with the result that politics has entered the judicial confirmation process and
judges are appointed based on political views that conform with the majority's view); BORK, supranote 57, at 3
(describing the massive annual pro-life march in Washington, D.C. to the Supreme Court on the anniversary of
Roe).
393. See supra note 391 (describing the average American's attachment to originalism); BARNETT, supra
note 11, at 1-2 (arguing that "judges and their academic enablers" undermine the "original Constitution" but,
because they "seek the obedience of the faithful," they will not admit to having done so); see also Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 338 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Seldom has an opinion of this Court rested so
obviously upon nothing but the personal views of its Members.").
394. Factors other than a decision's deviation from the original meaning can have a dramatic impact on the
public's perception of the decision's and the Court's legitimacy. Probably the most prominent examples of this
phenomenon are Brown and Roe. Brown is almost universally viewed by the American public as reaching a just
result-eliminating racial segregation-and consequently does not greatly undermine the Court's legitimacy. See
FALLON, supra note 6, at 58 (finding that today no one questions Brown's legitimacy because "[iln nearly all eyes,
Brown reflects the Supreme Court at its best"). Many Americans view Roe as tragically unjust-the sanctioning
of murder-hence the Court's legitimacy has continued to suffer because of Roe. See id. at 56 (recognizing that
Roe is "[mluch more controversial than Brown"); Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa., 505 U.S. 833, 867
(1992) (explaining why the Court cannot overrule Roe "under fire"); id. at 998 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (questioning
the Court's decision to "stand by an erroneous constitutional decision" because of "the substantial and continuing
public opposition the decision has generated"); PollingReport.com, Abortion and Birth Control, http://www.
pollingreport.com/abortion.htm (last visited May 4,2006) (listing numerous polls indicating sustained substantial
opposition to abortion in all or some situations).
395. The variability of a judge's duty when faced with nonoriginalist precedent maybe a particular instance
of a familiar occurrence. More generally, my duty to abide by unjust laws is variable and depends, among other
things, on the level of unjustness of the particular law. Thus, if a positive law is slightly unjust, but my breaking
the slightly unjust law would cause great harm to the common good, I am obliged to follow the slightly unjust law
to avoid greater harm to the common good. See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. I of pt. II, q. 96,
art. 4, at 1019-20 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947). However, if the
converse occurs-the law in question is gravely unjust and my not following the law would cause little harm to the
common good-I would not be obliged to follow the gravely unjust law. Or lastly, if the positive law in question
requires that I break Divine Law and does not simply contravene human good, I am obliged to disobey the law. See
id.
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precedent. A judge must evaluate many values that are difficult to weigh and
compare. 396 How much will overruling a particular decision harm stability? How
much weight should a judge give reliance interests? Is the rule announced in the
nonoriginalist decision workable? Is it deeply embedded in the law? Answering
these questions requires a high degree of practical wisdom.
There is no single rule of how a judge should address the Rule of Law values
because the circumstances regarding nonoriginalist cases are myriad. On one end
of the spectrum are cases where it is relatively clear that overruling the decision
would cause great harm to Rule of Law values. For example, Article I, Section 8,
Clause 5 of the Constitution authorizes Congress to "coin money."3' 97 There is a
strong scholarly consensus that Congress was not authorized by this provision to
issue paper money. 39 8 However, the Supreme Court held in the Legal Tender Cases
that acts passed by Congress making notes issued by the Federal Government legal
tender were constitutional. 39
Today, however, over 120 years later, paper money is ubiquitous. "[I]n our age
of checks, credit cards and electronic banking, the issue is off the agenda: no
Supreme Court would now reexamine the merits, no matter how closely wedded it
was to the original intent theory and no matter how certain it was of its
predecessor's error.'" A return to the original meaning-the Supreme Court
overruling the Legal Tender Cases-woulddramatically harm Rule of Law values.
As Robert Bork put the point, "Whatever might have been the proper ruling shortly
after the Civil War, if a judge today were to decide that paper money is
unconstitutional, we would think he ought to be accompanied not by a law clerk but
by a guardian. ' ""
On the other end of the spectrum are cases where overruling would not significantly harm Rule of Law values, either because the overruling itself would not harm
the values or because the nonoriginalist precedent harms Rule of Law values and
overruling the precedent would eliminate those harmful effects. A recent example
of this is Crawford v. Washington.' There the Court overruled a 1980 case, Ohio
v. Roberts, which had held that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment
did not bar admission of an unavailable witness' statements against a criminal
defendant if the statements bore "adequate 'indicia of reliability.'"4 3 The majority
in Crawfordfound that the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause prohibited

396. For a list of characteristics of a precedent to guide courts when determining whether to overrule a
precedent, see Rehnquist, supranote 32, at 358.
397. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
5.
398. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, The Legal Tender Cases, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 367, 389 ("[lIt is difficult
to escape the conclusion that the Framers intended to prohibit [the] use [of paper money]."); Claire Priest, Currency
Policies and Legal Development in Colonial New England, 110 YALE LJ. 1303, 1399 n.358 (2001) ("It is
uncontroversial that the Framers did not view the Constitution as giving Congress the power to issue paper money
to be invested with the status of legal tender.").
399. 110 U.S. 421 (1884).
400. Monaghan, supra note 6, at 744.
401. BORK, supra note 57, at 155.
402. 541 U.S. 36 (2004), overruling in part Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
403. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
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admission of unavailable witness' statements that were "testimonial" absent the
opportunity for cross-examination by the criminal defendant.'
The overruling of nonoriginalist precedent in Crawford had relatively little
negative impact on Rule of Law values and may, in fact, have advanced them. This
is because the rule announced in Crawford, unlike the "indicia of reliability" rule
from Roberts, is relatively easy to apply and applies in a more predictable manner
so defendants and the government can plan more accurately. Also, the rule in
4
Crawford accords with the results of most of the Court's case law in the area. "'
Importantly, there are few reliance interests harmed by the overruling of Roberts
because it does not affect previously existing property or contract interests and
because only the relatively small number of criminal defendants who had not yet
had a trial before Crawford was announced, and prosecutors prosecuting these
defendants, could conceivably have relied on Roberts.
The two ends of the spectrum are relatively easy to identify. By contrast, the vast
area between the ends requires sound practical wisdom. The duty of the judge in the
vast middle area is to determine whether and/or how overruling a nonoriginalist
precedent will harm the Rule of Law values so central to society's effective pursuit
of the common good. Unlike those cases where the original meaning is determinate
and judges have no discretion to utilize their judgment regarding what the natural
law would require in the case, here judges are relatively unconstrained and must
make practical judgments drawing on their virtue.
Two final notes before moving on: first, although I need to perform further
research into the issue, one possible manner by which much of the potential harm
to Rule of Law values caused by overruling nonoriginalist precedent could be
eliminated is through exercise of equitable power to tailor a court's order. For
example, a court could determine that, to allow society time to adjust to an
overruling, the court's ruling would take effect at a point in the future. Or, a court
could issue an order implementing its ruling in stages over a period of time. The
most prominent example of this equitable tailoring of an order is Brown v. Board
of its ruling taking into
of Education,where the Court tailored the implementation
4 6
0
desegregation.
facing
obstacles
systemic
the
account
Second, as Keith Whittington has suggested, a court faced with a nonoriginalist
precedent "need not seek to overturn the existing corpus of constitutional law
overnight, or even over a decade."'"" A court could initially limit the nonoriginalist
case and then, as the case law moves away from the nonoriginalist case, the case
becomes a relic that is relatively easily overruled. This slow evolution and eventual
overruling permits individuals and society to conform to the shift towards the
original meaning of the Constitution and away from the nonoriginalist precedent
with relatively little harm to Rule of Law values.

404.
405.
406.
407.

Crawford,541 U.S. at 53-54.
See id. at 57.
349 U.S. 294, 299-301 (1955).
WHITIINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 5, at 169.
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c. Non-Legal Justness
The last factor ajudge must consider when faced with a nonoriginalist precedent
is what I am going to call the non-legaljustness of the decision. Non-legal justness
is the characteristic of a precedent to rightly order the relationships of persons arid
institutions even though the judicial act of ordering-the announcement of the
precedent-was itself illegal because it was not in accord with the governing law.
This characteristic is summarized by the common expression, "I like the result of
the case," where one believes that the ruling in a case results in just relationships,
but at the same time believes that the judge was not authorized by the law to reach
the desirable result.
In any system of law such as ours that does not employ animate justice-where
the law making and law applying functions are separated' 8-the phenomenon of
non-legal justice will occur. Aristotle defined justice, broadly understood, asjustice
as lawfulness because of the central role law plays in enabling a society to
effectively pursue the common good.4°9 As St. Thomas described the connection,
"[S]ince it belongs to the law to direct to the common good.. .it follows that the
justice which is in this way styled general, is called legaljustice, because thereby
man is in harmony with the law which directs the acts of all the virtues to the
common good."41 Consequently, the just man is "the man who acts according to the
law."
Aristotle also described a narrower conception of justice: justice as equality, or
giving each his due.41' Modem scholars often employ the label "general"
justice for
412
justice as lawfulness, and "particular" justice for justice as equality.
There will be occasions where the positive law norm, when applied correctly,
will lead to an ordering of relationships that, absent the positive law norm, would
be unjust in the sense of justice as equality. In other words, the characteristic of
non-legal justness will be in tension with the characteristic of justice as lawfulness:
judgment in accord with the positive law.
For St. Thomas, this result arises because of the limited nature of the authority
of thejudicial office. Judges receive their authority to judge from their office, which

408. Perhaps the most prominent example of animate justice is King Solomon who had received from God
the grace of wise judgment: "Behold I have done for thee according to thy words, and have given thee a wise and
understanding heart, insomuch that there hath been no one like thee before thee, nor shall arise after thee." 3 Kings
3:12. And perhaps the most well-known example of Solomon's solomonic exercise ofjudgment occurred when two
women appeared before Solomon both claiming to be the mother of the same child:
The king therefore said: Bring me a sword. And when they had brought a sword before the king,
Divide, said he, the living child in two, and give half to one, and half to the other. But the
woman whose child was alive, said to the king.. .I
beseech thee, my lord, give her the child alive,
and do not kill it....The king answered, and said: Give the living child to this woman, and let
it not be killed, for she is the mother thereof.
Id. at 3:24-27.
409. ARIsTOTLE, NIcomAcHEAN ETHIcs 1129a-l 129b (D.P. Chase trans., E.P. Dutton 1911).
410. AQUINAS, supra note 395, pt. l of pt. 1,q. 58, art. 5, at 1438; see also id. pt. H of pt. IMq. 58, art. 7,
at 1439 ("[Llegal justice.. .directs man immediately to the common good....").
411. ARISTOTL supra note 40g, at 1129b.
412. See, e.g., JOHN FINNis, AQUINAS 130 n.e (1998) ("'General' is the more convenient qualifier because
Aquinas, following Aristotle, divides justice into 'general' (or 'legal') and 'particular' (or 'special')."); KRAUT,
supra note 37, at 102 n.6 ("Many scholars call justice as lawfulness 'universal' or 'general' justice, and justice as
equality 'particular' or 'special' justice.").
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is a creation of the judge's particular society.1 3 If a judge acts beyond that
authority, the judge has wrongfully usurped authority.41 4 In a society such as ours
that does not employ animate justice, a federal judge's authority extends only to
enforcement of the law: "Hence, it is necessary to judge according to the written
law .... ,415
Aquinas provided an example of the limitation of authority of public officials
where a city has a law that prohibits the opening of the city gate when the city is
besieged. 4 6 Aquinas further supposed that the enemy is pursuing the city's army,
which is outside of the city, and that without opening the gate the city's army will
be destroyed. Aquinas concluded that the relevant official should open the gates, but
with this important caveat:
Nevertheless it must be noted, that if the observance of the law according to the
letter does not involve any sudden risk needing instant remedy, it is not
competent for everyone to expound what is useful...: those alone can do this
who are in authority, and who, on account of such like cases, have the power to
dispense from the laws.417
Applied to our society's office of federal judge, Aquinas's example shows that even
when proper application of a just law would lead to what, absent the law, would be
an unjust ordering of relationships, the judge may not misapply the law because to
do so would contravene the limits of judicial authority.
A poignant example of this phenomenon is DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Departmentof Social Services."' There, the mother of four-year old Joshua, who
had been severely beaten by his father, leaving him profoundly mentally retarded,
sued the county social services department and local government officials.4 19 Prior
to the beating, the county officials had good reason to believe that Joshua's father
was abusing him.420 Joshua's mother argued that the failure of the county officers
to intervene to stop the abuse deprived Joshua of his liberty without due process in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.42'
The Supreme Court ruled, consistent with the text, history, and purpose of the
Due Process Clause, that the officials had not deprived Joshua of due process.422
The Court acknowledged the "undeniably tragic" facts of the case4 23 and how
"[j]udges and lawyers... [were] moved by natural sympathy in a case like this to find

413. AQUINAs, supra note 395, pt. II of pt. IL q. 60, art. 2, at 1447.
414. id.
415. Id. pt. Ilofpt. IL q. 60, art. 5, at 1450.
416. Id. pt. I of pt. M1q. 96, art. 6, at 1021.
417. Id. at 1021-22. A powerful example of Aquinas's belief that judges may not act contrary to the law is
when he asks whether it is lawful for a judge to pronounce a judgment against what he knows to be the truth
(acquired through the judge's private capacity) based on the evidence fairly submitted in a fair trial. Id. pt. IHof
pt. IL q. 67, art. 2, at 1483-84. Aquinas answers that the judge must "pronounce[] sentence according to the
law...and not according to his private opinion" because the judge "exercises public authority." Id. (emphasis
omitted).
418. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
419. Id. at 193.
420. Id. at 191-93.
421. ld. at 193.
422. Id. at 195-96.
423. Id. at 191.
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a way for Joshua and his mother to receive adequate compensation for the grievous
harm inflicted upon them."424 Despite the wrong dealt to Joshua and his mother, the
Court refused to incorrectly interpret or apply the positive law norm (the Due
Process Clause) to rightly order the relationships between Joshua, his mother, and
the government officials. The Court, in other words, acted justly (justice as
lawfulness) and refused to effect-through a legally unwarranted decision-rightly
ordered relationships among the parties (non-legal justness).
Many nonoriginalist decisions rightly order the relationships of persons and
institutions-Brown v. Board of Education probably being the most prominent
example-so judges will often have to address this factor. Brown, decided in 1954,
ruled that racial segregation in public schools was unconstitutional. 25 As the Court
itself apparently recognized, the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment did not outlaw racially segregated schools. 426 This
is also the scholarly consensus.427 Thus, assuming that the original meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause did not outlaw segregated public schools, the ruling in
Brown was not just (justice as lawfulness). The justices who misconstrued the
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause violated their oaths to uphold the
Constitution by disregarding the Clause's original meaning.
However, most agree that the result in Brown rightly ordered the relationships of
persons and institutions in states with segregated public schools. Black Americans
were no longer accorded and denied benefits solely on the basis of race, which is
rarely (if ever) an appropriate basis for such decisions. 428 The result in Brown,
though illegal, was just (non-legal justice).
The characteristic of a precedent of non-legal justness is something, all else
being equal, that a society and judge should prefer. Remember, the situation about
which we are concerned is not whether, prior to the deciding of a case, a society and
judge should prefer rightly ordered relationships between persons and institutions.
Given ajudge's duty to enforce the positive law norms of a society, the judge must
strive for legal justice, even at the expense of non-legal justice--even if following
the law would result (or allow to persist) in what, absent the legal norm, would'be
an unjust ordering of the relationships of the parties to the case. The situations
about which we are concerned are nonoriginalist precedents-precedents that, when
issued, violated the law-and our only question is what shall a judge do regarding
such precedents. One potential characteristic of such precedents that may make
retention of such a precedent more desirable is its non-legal justness.
Return again to Brown: assuming that the other two factors are in equipoise, a
judge is left with two possible worlds--one in which Brown is overruled and one
in which Brown is not overruled. The fact that not overruling Brown would more
likely lead to a society in which relationships, relative to the world where Brown is
overruled, are rightly ordered is a further reason to not overrule Brown.

424. Id. at 202-03.
425. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
426. See id. at 489-90.
427. See infra note 430.
428. Perhaps in the context of race riots in prison, for example, government could legitimately act based on
the race of rioters.
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3. Paradigm Examples of Nonoriginalist Precedents and Application of
Originalist Theory of Precedent
In this subsection I apply the originalist theory of precedent described above to
two of the most contentious Supreme Court decisions in the twentieth century:
Brown v. Boardof Educationand Roe v. Wade. These are the two decisions against
which constitutional interpretative methodologies are often measured by individuals
in light of their deeply held moral beliefs, and by scholars for intellectual
consistency.
Application of these three criteria429 calls for judges with virtue. The judge must
accurately apply and balance these criteria to determine whether to overrule a
nonoriginalist precedent. The applications below are preliminary in nature. Of
course, people may have legitimate differences on the conclusion of this complex
process.
a. Brown v. Board of Education
As previously stated, the first factor in deciding what to do with nonoriginalist
precedent is the extent of deviation from the original meaning. The scholarly
consensus is that Brown deviated from the original meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause.43 ° Even Michael McConnell, whose position is contrary to the scholarly
consensus, has noted:
An impressive array of academic authorities, from across the ideological and
jurisprudential spectrum-including such figures as Alexander Bickel, Laurence
Tribe, Richard Posner, Mark Tushnet, Raoul Berger, Ronald Dworkin, and
Walter Bums-had come to the conclusion that under the original understanding
of the Fourteenth Amendment, racial segregation of public schools was
constitutionally permissible.43 '
Perhaps the most powerful piece of evidence is that, when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified in 1868, the District of Columbia and twenty-four of

429. Again, the three factors are (1) the degree of departure of the nonoriginalist precedent from the original
meaning of the Constitution, (2) the impact on Rule of Law values caused by overruling the precedent, and (3) the
non-legal justness of the precedent. See supra notes 384-386 and accompanying text.
430. There has been significant scholarly research into whether the original meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause prohibited segregated public schools. The consensus is that it did not. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER,
GoVERNMENT BY THE JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OFTHE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 132-54 (2d ed. 1997)

(arguing that segregation was not precluded by the Fourteenth Amendment); BORK, supra note 57, at 75 ("The
inescapable fact is that those who ratified the amendment did not think it outlawed segregated education.");
LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DoRF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 12-13 (1991) ("There is very little

doubt that most of the [Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment] assumed that segregated public schools were, at
the time, entirely consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment."); Alexander M. Bickel, The OriginalUnderstanding
and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L. REV. 1, 58 (1955) (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment, "as
originally understood, was meant to apply neither to jury service, nor suffrage, nor antimiscegenation statutes, nor
segregation"); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral
Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 800 (1983) (concluding that "[i]f we asked [the framers] whether the
amendment outlawed segregation in public schools, they would answer 'No').
431. Michael W. McConnell, The OriginalistCasefor Brown v. Board of Education, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 457,457 (1996). For a powerful critique of the consensus position, see Michael W. McConnell, Originalism
and the DesegregationDecisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 955-84 (1995).
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thirty-seven states had de jure racially segregated public schools.432 However, even
if Brown violated the original meaning of the Clause, its ruling was not radically
contrary to the Clause's original meaning because the overall purpose of the Clause
was to remove the incidents of slavery of black Americans,4 33 a purpose with which
Brown comports.
Brown is not like other applications of the Clause, which have deviated much
further from the Clause's original meaning. For example, Justice O'Connor argued
in her concurrence in Lawrence v. Texas that the Texas statute, which prohibited
homosexual sodomy, violated the Clause.434 O'Connor relied on the claim that the
Equal Protection Clause "'is essentially a direction that all persons similarly
situated should be treated alike," 4 35 to find that Texas law was motivated only by
"a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, 4 3 6 and hence was not rational and
was therefore unconstitutional. This entire string of claims is only remotely related
to the original meaning of the Clause. In sum, if Brown deviated from the original
meaning of the Constitution, its deviation was not great.
The second factor is whether overruling the nonorginalist precedent would harm
Rule of Law values. The no-segregation rule announced in Brown is easy to apply
and it was clearly stated.4 37 The no-segregation rule of Brown has been consistently
applied by the Supreme Court, lower federal courts, and state courts. The rule is
now, over fifty years later, deeply embedded in our law, not only in the case law
following and implementing Brown, but through federal and state statutes, such as
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,43 which enforces and expands upon the Brown rule.
Further, state and federal institutions such as schools and public accommodations
premise their mode of operation on the Brown rule, and many federal and state
institutions are charged with ensuring the implementation of Brown. In sum,
overruling Brown would cause great harm to the Rule of Law values served by
precedent.
Last is the question of the non-legal justness of the precedent. As explained
above in the discussion concerning the third factor, Brown is a clear example of a
nonoriginalist decision creating rightly ordered relationships. In conclusion,
assuming that Brown is a nonoriginalist precedent, application of my theory of
originalist precedent likely calls for a judge to refrain from overruling Brown.

432. Michael J. Klarman, An InterpretativeHistoryofModern EqualProtection,90 MICH. L. REv. 213,252
(1991).
433. See 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTTUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE § 18.7, at 310 (3d ed. 1999) ("Their central concern throughout the debate was securing some rights
for freed blacks which state governments (or a future Democratic Congress) could not disregard.").
434. 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
435. Id. (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Cir., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)).
436. Id. at 580.
437. The only substantial question was the breadth of the rule, which was relatively quickly resolved by the
Court in subsequent cases:
Although Brown technically invalidated the separate but equal doctrine only as applied to
education, a series of Court decisions soon came down which indicated the invalidity of that
doctrine in other areas as well: public beaches and bathhouses, municipal golf courses, buses,
parks, public parks and golf courses, athletic contests, airport restaurants, courtroom seating,
and municipal auditoriums.
3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 433, § 18.8, at 332-33.
438. 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -el7 (2000).
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b. Roe v. Wade and Its Progeny
Roe held, in 1973, that a woman has a constitutionally protected right to
abortion. 39 The constitutional right announced in Roe is a large departure from the
original meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. First,
the Due Process Clause did not have substantive content when enacted." 0
Therefore, finding substantive rights in the term "liberty" is contrary to the original
meaning. Second, when the Due Process Clause was ratified in 1868, all states had
limits on abortion, many states strictly limited abortion, and the trend was toward
complete prohibition of abortion except in rare cases." 1 Therefore, the original
meaning of "liberty" did not encompass a right to abortion. Further, the primary
goal of the Due Process Clause was to ensure that newly freed black Americans
were protected from arbitrary deprivations simply because of racial animosity." 2
This is a concern far from preventing states from prohibiting the killing of unborn
human beings.
In contrast to Brown, overruling Roe would likely not harm Rule of Law values,
although there are factors pointing in both directions. The rule announced in Roe
(although not the rule in Casey) was clear and relatively easy to apply." 3 Also, the
principle of individual autonomy that Roe took from Griswold v. Connecticut' is
embedded in some parts of the Court's case law." 5 However, there is also case law
that limits the principle relied upon by Roe." 6 There are numerous state and federal
laws that attempt to limit Roe, along with several attempts at overruling it. These
include partial birth abortion bans;" 7 repeated attempts at a constitutional amendment to end abortion;" 8 the annual introduction of the Hyde Amendment, which
prohibits federal funding for abortions;" 9 restrictions on the use of military facilities

439. 410U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
440. See, e.g., ELY, supranote 69, at 98.
441. For a discussion of the legal history of abortion, see, for example, Robert M. Byrn, An American
Tragedy: The Supreme Courton Abortion, 41 FORDHAM L. REv. 807,827-39 (1973); Joseph W. Dellapenna, The
History ofAbortion: Technology, Morality, andLaw, 40 U. Prrr. L. REv. 359,365-416 (1979); Robert A. Destro,
Abortion and the Constitution: The Need for a Life-Protective Amendment, 63 CAL. L. REV. 1250, 1267-92
(1975); and James S. Witherspoon, ReexaminingRoe: Nineteenth-CenturyAbortion Statutesand the Fourteenth
Amendment, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 29 (1985).
442. 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 433, § 18.8, at 309-10.
443. For a discussion of Casey, see supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
444. 381 U.S. 479(1965).
445. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
446. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (observing that only those rights that are
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" are fundamental rights (quoting Moore v. E. Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 503 (1977)); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989) (using the same proposition); see also
Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1557-62 (arguing that Glucksberg significantly undercut Roe).
447. See Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201 (codified at 18
U.S.C.A. § 1531 (West Supp. 2005)). States have also imposed partial-birth abortion bans. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.01 (Supp. 1999); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-61-203 (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.0111 (West
Supp. 2002); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 513/5 (1999); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.17016(5)(c) (West Supp.
2000); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-326(9) (Supp. 1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-6(e) (West Supp. 2001); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.15(A) (West 1997).
448. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 12, 96th Cong. (1980).
449. See, e.g., Act of Nov. 20, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109,93 Stat. 923,926; Act of Oct. 12, 1979, Pub.
L. No. 96-86, § 118, 93 Stat. 656,662; Act of Oct. 18, 1978, Pub. L No. 95-480, § 210,92 Stat. 1567, 1586; Act
of Dec. 9, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-205, § 101, 91 Stat. 1460, 1460; Act of Sept. 30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209,
90 Stat. 1418, 1434.
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to provide
abortions; 450 attempts to restrict federal court jurisdiction
over abortion
41
cases; recognition that unborn children are criminal victims; 45 2 recognition that
54
453
unborn children are human beings; and requiring parental notification.1
Unlike Brown, there are no governmental institutions built to ensure widespread
acceptance and compliance with Roe. Instead, Roe and abortion continue to be what
is likely the most divisive issue in American legal and social life. Roe has also been
incredibly harmful to the institutional integrity of the Supreme Court and the Rule
of Law, as the plurality in Casey recognized.45 5 Further, federal and state governments have taken action to ensure that their governmental apparatuses do not
promote-and instead often act to limit-use of the abortion license.456
Scholars have severely criticized the broad conception of reliance used by the
Casey plurality, which makes the ability to procure abortion the nexus of people's
lives.457 A more traditional understanding of reliance would recognize that those
women who are pregnant (and those by whom they became pregnant) may have
acted in reliance on Roe.458 It is questionable whether there are many such
persons.459
Perhaps obviating the dispute over the nature of reliance is the fact that overruling Roe would return the legal landscape to the state-by-state regime that existed
prior to Roe, with some states permitting and some prohibiting abortion. Thus,
reliance by individuals on the right announced in Roe could be met in states that
permit abortion. In sum, although the conclusion is not as clear as with Brown, it is
likely that Rule of Law values would at least not be significantly harmed by
overruling Roe, and may in fact be advanced by overruling Roe.
Lastly, Roe is (non-legally) unjust. The proper relationship between human
beings-much less between mother and child-is one of respect: do unto others.
This principle is common across the political, ideological, and religious spectrum.'
450. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 1093(b) (2000); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-106, § 738, 110 Stat 186,384; see also Memorandum from William Mayer, M.D., Assistant Sec'y of
Def. to the Sec'ys of the Military Dep'ts (June 21, 1988), http://www.tricare.osd.mil/policy/memosabortion.html
(last visited Apr. 11, 2006).
451. See, e.g., H.R. 867,97th Cong. (1981); S. 158,97th Cong. (1981).
452. See, e.g., Unborn Victims of Violence Act (Laci and Conner's Law) of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-212, 118
Stat. 568 (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1841 (West Supp. 2005)); CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 1999); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 782.09 (West 2000); 720 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1.2, -2.1, -3.2 (West 2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS
SERV. § 750.322 & n.2 (LexisNexis 2003); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00 (McKinney 2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 2903.01-.05, .09 (LexisNexis 2003); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2601-05 (West 1998); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 1.07(a)(26) (Vernon Supp. 2004); Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1325 (Mass. 1984).
453. See supra note 452.
454. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.33 (2001); N.H. RE. STAT. ANN. §§ 132.24-.28 (2006); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 33.001-.011 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005).
455. Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa., 505 U.S. 833, 855, 861, 866-67, 869 (1992).
456. See supra note 447.
457. See, e.g., Paulsen, supranote 2, at 1554 ("[Tjhere is relatively little 'reliance' in the sense ofthe existing
rule having tended to create its own reliance-having caused people to 'sink costs,' so to speak.").
458. See id. at 1553 ("'raditionally, [reliance] is thought most apposite in the commercial context, where
resources have been committed and investments have been made in reliance on a legal rule or set of rules reflected
in judicial decisions.").
459. How many people are sexually intimate in reliance on access to abortion? How many people who
otherwise would be sexually intimate would not if Roe was reversed?
460. Luke 6:31; see also ARISTOTLE,supra note 409,bk. V; DWORKIN, supranote 67, at 7-8 ("[G]overnment
must treat all those subject to its dominion as having equal moral and political status; it must attempt, in good faith,
to treat them all with equal concern."); EMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 433

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36

Roe permits
the antithesis of this to flourish: one human being taking the life of
4 61
another.

In the United States since Roe, approximately 46 million abortions have
occurred. 462 The result has been the death of those aborted, the broken lives of
women who aborted their children, 3 the development and growth of an entire,
multi-million dollar industry that preys on the weaknesses and fears of women who
are pregnant in unfortunate circumstances, ' and a coarsening culture that
continually devalues human life. 5 Unlike Brown, the non-legal injustice wrought
by Roe counsels in favor of its overruling. In conclusion, a judge faced with the
question of whether to overrule Roe should probably overrule Roe.
4. Theory of Judicial Virtue Is Necessary to This Originalist Theory of
Precedent
The originalist theory of precedent I have been discussing provides that judges
will often have broad discretion to determine how to react to nonoriginalist
constitutional precedent. In this subsection, I will discuss the characterjudges must
(James W. Ellington trans., 1981) ("For all rational beings stand under the law that each of them should treat
himself and all others never merely as means but always at the same time as an end in himself.").
461. Without good reason unlike, for instance, self-defense.
462. Nat'l Right to Life, Abortion in the United States: Statistics and Trends, http://www.nrlc.org/abortion/
facts/abortionstats.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2006).
463. The negative effects of abortion include increased physical and mental health problems, see Philip G.
Ney et al., The Effects of PregnancyLoss on Women's Health, 38 SOC. SCi. MED. 1193, 1196-98 (1994) (finding
that abortion has a greater negative impact on women's health than miscarriages); David C. Reardon et al.,
Depressionand Unintended Pregnancyin the NationalLongitudinalSurvey of Youth: A CohortStudy, 324 BRrr.
J. MED. 151, 152 (2002) ("Among married women, those who aborted were significantly more likely to be at 'high
risk' of clinical depression compared to those who delivered unintended pregnancies."); increased rates of suicide
and homicide, see Mika Gissler et al., InjuryDeaths, Suicides and HomicidesAssociated with Pregnancy,Finland
1987-2000, 15 EUR. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 459, 462 (2005) ("In the year after undergoing an abortion, a woman's
mortality rate for unintentional injuries, suicide and homicide was substantially higher than among non-pregnant
women in all age groups combined."); David C. Reardon et al., DeathsAssociated with Pregnancy Outcome: A
Record Linkage Study of Low Income Women, 95 S. MED. J. 834, 837-38 (2002) (finding the same); increased
maternal substance abuse, see Priscilla K. Coleman et al., Substance Use Among PregnantWomen in the Context
of Previous Reproductive Loss and Desirefor Current Pregnancy, 10 BRIT. J. OF PSYCHOL. 255, 261 (2005)
("(H]istory of one induced abortion compared with no history of abortion was associated with a significantly higher
likelihood of using substances of all forms during pregnancy...."); Priscilla K. Coleman et al., A History ofInduced
Abortion in Relation to Substance Use During Subsequent PregnanciesCarriedto Term, 187 AM. J. OBSTETRICS
& GYNEcOLOGY 1673, 1677 (2002) ("[The results revealed significantly higher rates of consumption associated
with a previous abortion, compared with previous birth relative to the use of any illicit drugs and alcohol."); and
increased risk of complications in future pregnancies and births, see Jean Bouyer et al., Risk Factorsfor Ectopic
Pregnancy: A Comprehensive Analysis Based on a Large Case-Control, Population-Based Study in France, 157
Am. J. EPImaMioLOGy 185, 192 (2003) (finding an increased risk of ectopic pregnancy from prior induced
abortions); Brent Rooney et al., InducedAbortionand Risk of LaterPrematureBirths, 8 J. OF AM. PHYSICIANS &
SURGEONS 46, 46 (2003) (finding an increased risk of low birth weight and premature birth from prior induced
abortions).
464. Abortion is an approximately $500 million per year industry. See Stanley K. Henshaw, The Accessibility
of Abortion Services in the United States, 2001, 35 PERSP. ON SEXUAL AND REPROD. HEALTH, 16, 19 (2003)
(finding that in 2001 the average cost of an abortion was $372); Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw,
Estimatesof U.S. Abortion Incidence in 2001 and2002, at 7 tbl. 1(2005), availableat http://www.guttmacher.org/
pubs/2005/05/l8/abincidence.pdf (estimating 1,303,000 abortions in 2001).
465. See Nat'l Conference of Catholic Bishops, Abortion and the Supreme Court: Advancing the Culture of
Death, http://www.nccbuscc.org/prolifelissues/abortion/culture.htm (last visited May 4, 2006) (noting the
coarsening of American culture because of Roe). For an example of the coarsening of American culture, see MTV,
Yo Mamma, http://www.mtv.com/onair/dyn/yo..momma/about.jhtml (last visited May 4, 2006) ("Yo Momma is
a no-holds-barred competition that pits toughest trash-talkers against one another.").
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have to properly exercise this discretion. A judge needs certain virtues to be an
excellentjudge, and most prominent among these is justice and practical wisdom.4'
The just judge will have respect for, and abide by, the laws of his society.
Aristotle defined justice as "act[ing] according to the law"-as the "lawful"-and
'
as "equal."467
Here, I concentrate on Aristotle's discussion of justice as lawfulness,
which encompasses both types ofjustice. 4 8 Richard Kraut has explained Aristotle's
conception of justice as lawfulness as "the intellectual and emotional skill one
needs in order to do one's part in bringing it about that one's community possesses
[a] stable system of rules and laws."469
Aristotle, in explaining justice as lawfulness and why the just man is obligated
by the law, relates the law back to the common good:
[F]urther, it is plain that all Lawful things are in a manner Just, because by
Lawful we understand what have been defined by the legislative power and each
of these we say is Just. The Laws too give directions on all points, aiming...at
the common good of all[:] ... those things that are apt to produce and preserve
happiness and its ingredients for the social community.'
The law is the primary means through which the society secures the ordering
necessary to secure the common good. The just person will therefore bring about
and uphold society's laws.
A judge's duty is not to second-guess the legislative determination of how the
natural law should be made effective.47 ' This obedience to the law is the essence of
justice as lawfulness. A judge acts unjustly when he refuses to enforce a law simply
because the judge believes the law to be imprudent. In doing so, the judge "sets
himself up as a rival to the body that has the authority to make laws." '72 The
excellent judge will determine cases, if possible, on the basis of the conventional
meaning of the laws of his society.473 The judge must possess the virtue of justice
as lawfulness to give the legal materials their due regard.

466. For a more complete discussion of judicial virtue, see Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence:A
Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 34 MErAPHILosoPHY 178 (2003), available at http://ssm.com/abstract
=369940.
467. ARImSTTLE, supra note 409, at 1129a.
468. See KRAuT, supra note 37, at 102-03 (discussing the distinction between the two forms of justice).
Kraut explains that justice as lawfulness is the virtue of following the laws of the community, while justice as
equality is a narrower concept of giving each his due. Id. at 102-03, 107.
469. Id. at 106.
470. ARISTOTLE, supra note 409, at 1129b.
471. The question of the role of judges in making the natural law effective is one for each society to make;
it is a positive and not natural law decision. In fact, Aquinas argued that it is better for judges to act in a secondary
law-making role for a number of prudential reasons. AQUINAS, supra note 395, pt. I of pt. IL q. 95, art. 1, at
1013-14.
472. KRAUT, supra note 37, at 110.
473. The judge has the duty to enforce the natural law as made effective in the society throughthe positive
law. Aquinas wrote:
Laws framed by man are either just or unjust. If they be just, they have the power of binding in
conscience, from the eternal law whence they are derived... .Now laws are said to be just, both
from the end, when, to wit, they are ordained to the common good,-and from their author, that
is to say, when the law that is made does not exceed the power of the lawgiver,-and from their
form, when, to wit, burdens are laid on the subjects, according to an equality of proportion and
with a view to the common good.
AQUINAS, supranote 395, pt. I of pt. IL q. 96, art. 4, at 10 19-20.
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Judges must also possess and use their practical wisdom4 74 to accurately weigh
the factors judges must take into account when deciding how to deal with
nonoriginalist precedent. Practical wisdom is the virtue of being able to correctly
discern in the contingent circumstances in which one finds oneself, what course of
action is correct.475 Contingent matters are the everyday circumstances of our
individual and social lives "where there is no definite rule" of action.476
Parents know of the necessity for practical wisdom because they are faced with
the countless, variable situations that, for example, potentially call for discipline of
their children. But knowing when and how one is to discipline one's child is often
very difficult to discern because of the competing values, the uncertainty of the
facts of the situation, and the uncertain manner by which norms of conduct apply
to the child's actions. It is in these "thick" or highly contextualized situations that
one has need of practical wisdom, gained by experience4 77 or grace,478 to discern the
correct course of conduct.
Judges will utilize their practical wisdom when faced with the legal underdeterminacy caused by nonoriginalist precedent. The judge will have to weigh the
various values set out here to determine whether to overrule a nonoriginalist precedent, limit it, or continue to build on it. These questions are highly contextualized;
there are no clear norms guiding action. Hence, in order to make accurate
judgments, judges will need practical wisdom.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this Article I have advanced an originalist theory of precedent. Under this
theory, a judge must exercise discretion to determine which nonoriginalist precedents to overrule. I have offered three criteria that judges should use in making such
ajudgment. I have also briefly described some of the virtues necessary to make this
judgment. My originalist theory of precedent builds on my understanding of
originalism, which has at its foundation a conception of the Constitution as a
prudential social ordering decision that enables our society to effectively pursue the
common good. This understanding of the nature of the Constitution, and of judges
as guardians of the constitutional social ordering, is confirmed by the original
meaning of judicial power, which includes stare decisis.

474. More specifically, the type of prudence judges must possess is political prudence "which is directed to
the common good of the state." Id. pt. U of pt. U, q. 47, art. 11, at 1396.
475. See id. pt. U1of pt. II, q. 47, art. 1, at 1389 ("Prudence is the knowledge of what to seek and what to
avoid.") (emphasis omitted); see also id. ("A prudent man is one who sees as it were from afar, for his sight is keen,
and he foresees the event of uncertainties.") (emphasis omitted).
476. ARISTOTLE, supra note 409, at 1140a.
477. See id. at 1142a.
478. See AQUINAS, supra note 395, pt. 11of pt. II, q. 47, art. 14, at 1397-98.

